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"[T]he duty of directors [is] to evaluate proposed business
combinations on their merits and oppose those detrimental to
the well-being of the corporation even if that is at the ex-
pense of the short term interests of individual shareholders." 1
"At some point, there is a rebellion against greed." Martin
Weinstein, manager of a Wall Street arbitrage firm.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate takeovers, leveraged buyouts ("LBO's"),3 and mergers
have been the focus of much of the recent corporate research in both
the legal and business communities.4 The rate of mergers and acquisitions
in the last decade was at an all time high,' and at least thirty-nine states
I. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 299 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981). In this case the management of Marshall Field through defensive
maneuvers, including acquiring companies and instituting an anti-trust suit, was able to
defeat a tender offer made at $42 a share at a time when the market price for the stock
was $22 a share. After the offer was defeated the stock dropped to $19.76 a share. See
also Steinberg, Tender Offer Regulation: The Need for Reform, 23 Wake Forest L. Rev.
1, 3 n.2 (1988).
2. Salwen, Investors Fret Over Possible LBO Curbs, Wall Street Journal Nov. 10,
1988, at Cl, C23.
3. A leveraged buyout is a corporate control transaction where the public shareholders
are cashed out, usually with corporate insiders obtaining a substantial equity interest. The
transaction is financed by borrowing funds collateralized by the corporation's assets with
the repayment of the loans to be made out of the company's future revenue stream and
by sale of certain assets of the corporation. M. Steinberg, Understanding Securities Law
249, 252 (1989).
4. Ribstein, Takeover Defenses and the Corporate Contract, 78 Geo. L.J. 71, 72
(1989); Scherer, 2 J. Econ. Persp. 69, 69 (Winter 1988).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 19-25.
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including Louisiana have now adopted anti-takeover statutes. 6 This leg-
islation significantly impairs the ability of outside bidders to purchase
a corporation.7 The respective state legislatures, nevertheless, adopted
these statutes based on the representations of corporate managers gen-
erally, with no public comment or debate.
There is no agreement in the business or academic community on
the effects of mergers and acquisitions, or how they should be regulated.
But some facts are clear. Managers of public corporations are making
astronomical salaries that are not related to corporate performance or
any other objective criteria. Shareholders, on the other hand, have
received tremendous returns on takeovers and related restructuring, but
outside of these transactions have received little of the value that cor-
porations have generated. Finally, the use of leverage, borrowed money,
in corporations is at an all time high.
The passage of state takeover statutes effectively removes share-
holders from the corporate democracy and entrenches management.
Shareholders should have the right to shield their corporate manager's
job if they feel it is in their and the corporation's best interest. However,
these management protections should not be imposed without shareholder
approval. The unilateral imposition of anti-takeover amendments through
management lobbying of state legislatures grants corporate management
an almost permanent position with no right of removal for shareholders
or society.
To solve these problems, without creating further controversy, this
paper proposes a moderate course of limited federal preemption of state
corporate law. This paper's proposal has three points. First, all state
statutes that impose particular requirements before a change of control
can be affected, whether through shareholder approval, mandatory re-
demptions, share purchase prices, or waiting periods, must apply equally
to both outside bidders and management. Second, all state anti-takeover
statutes that limit the sale of shares in a tender offer or other transaction
or restrict the ability of a shareholder to change control of the cor-
poration must be approved by at least a majority of shareholders before
the measure is effective. Finally, the use of leverage should be dis-
couraged by equalizing the taxation of debt and equity through at least
a fifty percent tax exemption for dividend income, offset by a corre-
sponding increase in corporate rates to make the measure revenue neutral.
Briefly, the paper is broken down into nine parts. Following this
introduction, section two discusses the issues involved in corporate take-
over transactions and how these issues have been confused to support
6. De Facto Federal Anti-Bidder Stance Exists Through State Laws, IRRC Says, 21
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1501 (Oct. 6, 1989).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 75-83.
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anti-takeover statutes. Section three contains a brief overview of the
history and types of anti-takeover statutes. Section four describes the
workings and effects of anti-takeover statutes. Section five analyzes the
politics behind the passage of anti-takeover statutes and compares po-
litical justifications offered with the economic effects of the statutes.
Section six argues that anti-takeover statutes protect the group needing
the least protection, i.e., management, while increasing the divergence
between the corporate managers' and shareholders' interest. Section seven
recognizes that some of the states' concerns are real, but would be
better addressed by reducing the amount of leverage in corporate finance,
and section eight suggests possible federal legislation. Section nine is a
summation of the previous seven sections.
II. TH IssuEs BiEmiND THE STATUTES
Senator Lloyd Bentsen, the Chairman of the Senate Finance Com-
mittee, expressed the general feeling around Congress about legislation
to regulate corporate takeovers when he stated "I don't want to devise
a cure that is worse than the condition.' But what the Congress and
the public have ignored is that the states have not been afraid and are
rapidly changing the shape of America's corporate landscape.
The problem with analyzing state anti-takeover statutes is the lack
of agreement in the academic and business community regarding the
effects of takeovers, anti-takeover statutes, and the roles of corporations
in our society. 9 There is no consensus among economists, political scien-
tists, or business professors on effects of takeovers and from where the
gains in these transactions derive.' 0 Many opponents of corporate tak-
eovers and restructuring have vested interests, such as the Business
8. Birnbaum, Congressional Action on LBOs Slows to Dragging Feat, Wall St. J.,
March 9, 1989 at Cl.
9. See, e.g., Corporate Takeovers: Public Policy Implications for the Economy and
Corporate Governance, A Report from the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Telecom-
munications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the Committee on Energy and Com-
merce, House of Representatives, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1987) [hereinafter Corporate
Takeovers]. This dissension is well-recognized in the literature, see, e.g., J. Coffee, Jr.,
L. Lowenstein, S. Rose-Ackerman, Knights, Raiders, and Targets 3 (1988) [hereinafter
Coffee].
10. Corporate Takeovers, supra note 9, at 15-17; Fortier, Hostile Takeovers and the
Market for Corporate Control, Economic Perspectives (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago)
Jan./Feb. 1989 at 10. Many studies attacking takeovers rely on incomplete methodologies
or mistaken assumptions. See, e.g., Easterbrook and Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1169-74 (1981).
Hacki and Testani, Second Generation State Takeover Statutes and Shareholder Wealth:
An Empirical Study, 97 Yale L.J. 1193, 1200 (1988) [hereinafter Hackl].
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Roundtable or leading anti-takeover lawyers." In fact, corporate exec-
utives have made a concerted effort both in the state and federal
governments and in the popular media to attack corporate takeovers. 12
The uncertainty regarding anti-takeover statutes is increased because
of the confusion of issues surrounding corporate takeover transactions. 3
State anti-takeover statutes are justified on bases that are unrelated to
change of control transactions. 14 To simplify the issues, this paper has
grouped some of the issues surrounding corporate takeovers into six
11. One of takeovers' most voracious opponents, Martin Lipton, author of some of
the "bibles" in takeover defense makes tremendous amounts of money, at rates equivalent
to $5,000 an hour, for his advice. Ironically he often advocates tactics in "defending"
a corporation that he disparages as hurting the American economy. See Dire Prophecy
on Takeovers By One Who Knows Them, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4 1988 at DI. See also
Grippo, In Defense of State Takeover Laws, 8 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 273 (1988) (The author
is the name partner of a leading Chicago anti-takeover firm and the former Illinois
Securities Commissioner).
Some of Mr. Lipton's articles include: Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance
Corporatism, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1987); Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom 35
Bus. L. 101 (1979); Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: A Response to Professors
Easterbrook and Fischel, 55 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1231 (1980).
12. See, e.g., Hostile Takeovers, Hearings before the Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. (S. Hrg. 100-50) at 128-
253 (1987) [hereinafter Hostile Takeovers] (CEO's of seventeen corporations testified against
takeovers.); Smale, What About Shareowners' Responsibility, Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 1987,
at 28 (CEO of Proctor and Gamble, John G. Smale); Impact of Mergers and Acquisitions
on Communities and Small Businesses, Hearing before the Committee on Small Business,
House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., (Ser. No. 100-34) at 5 (1987) [hereinafter
Impact of Mergers] (Statement of Lee Iacocca to the National Governors' Association
quoted in statement of Moon Landrieu, chairman of the Coalition to Stop the Raid on
America). For examples of statements given to local papers, see, e.g., Norman, Ownership
Moves Out of State, Milwaukee Journal, Feb. 1, 1987, at Dl; Cavaluzzi, Anti-Takeover
Law Will Protect More than Big Business, Asbury Park Press (New Jersey), May 11,
1987.
This effort is not surprising since corporate managers usually lose their jobs and their
generous benefits in a takeover. Jensen, A Helping Hand for Entrenched Managers, Wall
St. J., Nov. 4, 1987 at 36. Sixty-two percent of top managers lose their jobs within 3
years of a hostile takeover, compared to 21% in firms with no change in control. Id.
See also Life After Redundancy, Mergers and Acquisitions, Nov./Dec. 1989 at 14. (Almost
one half of high level executives that are currently looking for work attributed their job
loss to a merger, while only 28% of mid level management blamed their job loss on a
merger or merger-related acquisition).
13. SEC Commissioner Joseph Grundfest stated that the myths surrounding hostile
offers are "so divorced from reality" that it was time to perform a "mythectomy."
Hostile Two-Tier Tender Offers Fading From Picture, Grundfest Says, 19 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) 788 (1987).
14. See, e.g., Orr, Shareholders Need a Knight-Errant, Wall St. J. May 27, 1987,
at 30.
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areas: antitrust; 5 change of control; insider trading; 6 the scope of man-
agement's fiduciary duty in change of control transactions; 7 debt/equity
ratios and the effect of leverage on the economy; and the role of groups
outside management and the shareholders in corporate governance. 8
These issues are interrelated, but distinct. State anti-takeover statutes
are not drafted to address anti-trust and insider trading, and these issues
15. Although largely ignored under the Reagan and Bush administrations, the wisdom
of allowing increasing corporate concentration is still an important issue in the takeover
arena. Out of 10,000 mergers announced during 1980-1985 only 26 were challenged, and
only 13 were actually challenged in court. Sullivan, The Antitrust Division as a Regulatory
Agency: An Enforcement Policy in Transition in Public Policy Toward Corporate Tak-
eovers 106 (Chilton and Weidenbaum eds. 1988) [hereinafter Chilton]. See also, e.g.,
Austin, Antitrust Reaction to the Merger Wave: The Revolution v. the Counterrevolution,
66 N.C.L. Rev. 931 (1988). Comment, Takeover Dangers and Non-Shareholders: Who
Should Be Our Brothers' Keeper?, Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 301, 333-35 (1988) [hereinafter
Takeover Dangers]; Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical
Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 Colum. L. Rev.
1145, 1272 (1984) [hereinafter Regulating the Market].
16. See Grundfest, Jarrell, Salop and White, Panel Discussion: Corporate Takeovers
and Public Policy, in A. Auerbach, Corporate Takeovers 312 (1988). This issue came to
the forefront during the trial of Ivan Boesky and is a continuing area of concern. The
proprietary rights of information regarding takeovers, nevertheless, is only ancillary to
the takeover question. Insider trading is often blamed on change of control transactions.
See also Grippo, supra note 11, at 282. The issues are not related except that change of
control transactions graphically demonstrate the importance of information regarding the
value of a corporation's assets. As anything, this information can be stolen by inside
traders.
17. The business judgment rule has been well recognized as inadequate and inap-
propriate in change of control transactions. See Ex-SEC Member Urges Action to Protect
Shareholder Rights in Control Contests, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1494 (1989);
Steinberg, supra note 1, at 4; Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do
Interests Diverge in a Merge?, 28 J. L. & Econ. 151-53 (1985); Repetti, Management
Buyouts, Efficient Markets, Fair Value, and Soft Information, 67 N.C.L. Rev. 121 (1988).
Management's duty in leveraged buyouts is particularly a problem. See Longstreth, Fairness
of Management Buyouts Needs Evaluation, Legal Times, Oct. 10, 1983, at 15; Hector,
Are Shareholders Cheated by LBOs, Fortune, Jan. 10, 1987, at 100.
18. See, e.g., R. Nader, M. Green, & E. Seligman, Constitutionalizing the Corpo-
ration: The Case for the Federal Chartering of Giant Corporations (1976); Schwartz,
Towards New Corporate Goals; Co-existence with Society, 60 Geo. L. Rev. 57 (1971).
Initially brought up by Ralph Nader and other consumer and labor activists, this approach
was rejected by corporate managers until recently when it was discovered that it could
rationalize management defensive maneuvers. See, e.g., Corporate Takeovers, supra note
9, at 48-49. The Chairman of the Control Data Corporation commented:
The debate over hostile takeovers has focused on traditional notions about the
"rights" of shareholders, bidders, and the efficient operation of the markets
.... But today's corporation is much more than that; the constituencies it
serves and is responsible to (and who can thus be helped or harmed when it
changes hands) reach into the entire fabric of our society. And that fabric is
being torn.
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will not be discussed. This paper focuses on the change of control and
leverage issues and also addresses the scope of fiduciary duties and
corporate governance as they affect and are affected by change of control
transactions and leverage.
A. The Importance of Mergers and Acquisitions
Despite the disagreement in the academic and business communities,
mergers and acquisitions unquestionably are an important aspect of the
American economy. Mergers and acquisitions have been at an all time
high in the 1980's. In 1988, more than 3,487 merger transactions, in-
cluding 318 LBO's, took place worth an estimated $227 billion.' 9 The
total value of these transactions from 1979-1989 is over $2.142 trillion. 20
The value of the individual transactions can be tremendous. The RJR
Nabisco LBO by Kohlberg, Kravis Roberts & Co. (KKR), for example,
involved over $25 billion,2' and the Philip Morris Brothers Inc. acqui-
sition of Kraft Inc. was for $12.6 billion. 22
Of these transactions, only three and one-half percent were initiated
by tender offer, and just less than a third of these transactions were
contested by management. 23 In the one percent of all transactions that
19. 1988 Profile, Mergers and Acquisitions, May/June 1989 at p. 53; Pensions and
Leveraged Buyouts, Congressional Research Service for the Subcommittee on Labor-
Management Relations of the Committee on Education and Labor, House of Represen-
tatives, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1989). A table of the last ten years of merger transactions
follows.
Mergers 1979-1988
year # all # LBO's value all Value %change
Mergers* Mergers LBO value of all
($ millions) ($ millions) mergers
1978 1,4 52 -. ...
1979 1,530 - 34,197 5.3
1980 1,560 - 32,883 -3.8
1981 2,329 99 70,064 3,091 113.1
1982 2,298 164 60,698 3,451 -13.4
1983 2,391 230 52,691 4,519 -13.1
1984 3,164 253 126,073 18,807 139.3
1985 3,437 254 145,464 19,633 15.4
1986 4,381 254 204,894 46,429 40.9
1987 3,920 259 177,203 35,636 -13.5
1988 3,487 318 226,643 42,914 27.9
*All mergers includes divestitures and LBOs.
Id.
20. 1988 Profile, supra note 19, at 53.
21. Smith, Merger Boom Defies Expectations, Wall St. J., Jan. 3, 1989, at 8R.
22. 1988 Profile, supra note 19, at 47.
23. Fortier, supra note 10, at 2, Table 1. Of course management originally may have
objected to many of these transactions and were later bought off or dropped their
opposition for other reasons. Furthermore, there is no record of any possible hostile offers
which failed to reach the offering stage because of hostile management tactics.
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were contested, management was successful in defeating the offer fifty-
four percent of the time,2 either outright or through the intervention
of a white knight.
25
III. ANTI-TAKEOVER STATUTES
At least thirty-nine states now have anti-takeover laws, including
Louisiana.26 It was estimated in 1988 that over eighty percent of Amer-
ican business capital is protected by state anti-takeover statutes.27 What
began as responses to pleas of particular corporations for defenses against
pending takeover offers has snowballed into almost a prerequisite for
most states to keep their domestic corporations incorporated and op-
erating in their own state. State anti-takeover statutes have provided
further defenses for management to resist takeovers. These state-sanc-
tioned statutory defenses increase the transaction cost of taking over
the corporation and deter takeovers, therefore allowing more manage-
ment waste.
28
State anti-takeover statutes are usually pushed by a single corpor-
ation's management that is afraid of being replaced by a takeover. In
general, these statutes are passed with no public comment and with very
little discussion in the respective state legislature. The statutes are justified
as necessary to protect shareholders, employees and local communities.
Moreover, these statutes neither protect nor help shareholders,2 9 and
clear evidence does not exist suggesting that other remaining corporate
constituencies such as the employees are adversely affected. 0
The respective states enacting anti-takeover legislation certainly have
valid interests in seeking to protect their local communities and the
employees, but statutes that attempt to limit the change of control are
not treating the problem. If anything has really affected the states and
the United States as a whole, it is the amount of leverage that is used
in today's corporate financing. Although definitive evidence establishing
24. Id. Some commentators believe that neither friendly nor hostile takeovers have
had a significant impact on the overall United States economy. See Weidenbaum, in
Chilton, supra note 15, at 76; Sprinkel, The Real Issue in Corporate Takeovers, Wall
St. J., July 17, 1987, at 18.
25. A "White Knight" is a party sought out by the target company in an attempt
to fend off an unwanted bidder and preserve the current target management's control.
Actions by a white knight include launching a competing tender offer or purchasing
selected assets, Steinberg, supra note 3, at 320.
26. See supra note 6. As of this writing, the states not having anti-takeover laws
are: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Montana, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Texas, Vermont and West Virginia. Id.
27. Bandow, Curbing Raiders is Bad for Business, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1988 at C2.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 87-100.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 148-76.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 179-86.
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that the current record amounts of leverage are harmful does not exist,
any harm to local communities and corporations results from the in-
creased amounts of leverage, rather than the change of control.
A. History of Anti-Takeover Statutes
1. First Generation Statutes
Virginia enacted the first anti-takeover statute in 1968.31 At least
thirty-six other states soon followed suit.32 These statutes relied on
disclosure provisions similar to the Williams Act, 3 and also required a
determination of the fairness of the offer by the state securities com-
missioner. 4 Some statutes also imposed additional waiting periods to
the twenty day period of the Williams Act for tender offers. 5 The first
generation statutes were enacted as part of the state securities laws, i.e.,
Blue Sky laws, as an additional protection to the Williams Act. Even
before the great takeover debates of the 1980's, these statutes were
recognized as favoring management and actually not designed to help
shareholders.3 6
Courts held these statutes unconstitutional in various piecemeal de-
cisions.17 The United States Supreme Court in Edgar v. MITE Corp.3"
finally deemed the statutes an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce.3 9
2. Second Generation and Beyond
After the Supreme Court held the first generation statutes uncon-
stitutional, several states quickly began to draft new anti-takeover sta-
31. Warren, Developments in State Takeover Regulation: MITE and its Aftermath,
40 Bus. Law. 671 (1985).
32. Id. Louisiana adopted its first anti-takeover statute, a first generation statute in
1976. 1976 La. Acts No. 44, repealed in 1987. The Louisiana statute, La. R.S. 51:1500,
was the typical disclosure type first generation statute, and was passed officially to limit
the coercive effects of tender offers.
33. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1989).
34. Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects, and Political Com-
petency, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 213, 226-31 (1977).
35. Hazen, State Anti-Takeover Legislation: The Second and Third Generations, 23
Wake Forest L. Rev. 77, 80 (1988). For examples of repealed statutes, see Ill. Rev. Stat.
ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.51-.70 (1979) (repealed 1983).
36. Langevoort, supra note 34, at 220, 225.
37. See, e.g., Bendix Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522 (D. Md.
1982) (striking down Maryland's first generation statute).
38. 457 U.S. 624, 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982).
39. Id. at 643-45, 102 S. Ct. at 2640-41. The court did not hold the law unconsti-
tutional based on preemption by the Williams Act, as had some lower courts.
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tutes, the so-called second generation statutes. These new anti-takeover
statutes were based on defenses that had been previously adopted by
shareholder approval as amendments to a corporation's charter. 4° Fur-
thermore, these statutes were not included as part of the state's securities
laws, but were adopted as amendments to the respective state's cor-
poration's code.
4
'
After the second generation statutes were upheld in CTS Corporation
v. Dynamics Corp. ,4 states became bolder and began enacting statutes
that applied not only to domestically chartered corporations, but also
to out-of-state corporations that had only significant contacts. These
statutes have been referred to as fourth generation statutes. 43
The second generation anti-takeover statutes legislatively enact pop-
ular corporate defensive maneuvers." The statutes have been based on
five basic forms: (1) the control share acquisition statute, first enacted
by Ohio;4 5 (2) the fair price statute, first enacted by Maryland;"4 (3) the
share redemption statute, first enacted by Pennsylvania; (4) the expanded
fiduciary duty statute, also first enacted by Pennsylvania; 47 and (5) the
business combination statute, first enacted by New York. 48 States also
may enact a package of several different statutes to provide layered
defenses to corporations.49
IV. How ANTI-TAKEOVER STATUTES WORK AND THEIR EFFECTS
A. Louisiana as an Example
Louisiana is a typical example of a state enacting anti-takeover laws.
Louisiana previously had enacted a first generation statute in 1976.50
40. Hackl, supra note 10, at 1203.
41. See Thompson, Tender Offer Regulation and the Federalization of State Corporate
Law, in Chilton, supra note 15, at 78, 87.
42. 481 U.S. 69, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
43. Pinto, The Constitution and the Market for Corporate Control: State Takeover
Statutes after CTS Corp., 29 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 699, 714 (1988).
44. Thompson, supra note 41, at 88. Pennsylvania's 1983 anti-takeover statute enacted
three popular anti-takeover devices that had been previously effected through amendments
to corporate charters. See Comment, The 1983 Amendments to Pennsylvania's Business
Corporation Law: Unconstitutional? MITE Be, 89 Dick. L. Rev. 401 (1985).
45. Warren, supra note 31, at 694-95. See also Kreider, Fortress Without Foundation?
Ohio Takeover Act II, 52 U. Cin. L. Rev. 108 (1983).
46. Md. Corps. & Ass'ns. Code Ann. §§ 3-601 to -603, 8-301(14) (1989).
47. 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1910 (Purdon 1989) (repealed 1989).
48. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 912 (b). (McKinney 1986).
49. This was pioneered by Wisconsin. Malmgren and Pelisek, Take-Overs of Wisconsin
Corporations, 57 Wis. Bar Bull. 26, 30 (1984); Warren, supra note 31, at 699. Fourteen
states have 4 or more anti-takeover statutes, and 3 states have 6 separate anti-takeover
statutes. Most of the remaining 22 states have enacted 2 anti-takeover statutes. See supra
note 6, at 1502.
50. 1976 La. Acts No. 189 (repealed).
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After Edgar v. MITE, Louisiana adopted a second generation takeover
statute, a fair price provision," in 1984.52 After CTS Corp., Louisiana
adopted several second generation statutes in a third generation config-
uration. Finally, Louisiana passed a fourth generation nexus version of
the control share acquisition statute in 1988.
Louisiana now has enacted five separate anti-takeover provisions.
Louisiana has adopted: a control share acquisition statute,53 a foreign
corporation control share acquisition statute5 4 a fair price statute,5 an
expanded fiduciary duty statute 5 6 and a poison pill statute. 7 All of
these provisions were adopted with almost no discussion in the legislature
or the media and were promoted by single corporations. s The provisions
were justified as necessary to protect domestic corporations' shareholders,
and retain existing businesses.
1. Scope of the Statutes
Under Louisiana's anti-takeover statutes, a corporation that has its
principal place of business or substantial assets within Louisiana, and
either more than ten percent of its shareholders, ten thousand share-
holders, or more than ten percent of the corporation's shares are owned
by persons residing in Louisiana, is governed by the control share
acquisition act.5 9 The above requirements were expanded under Louis-
iana's Foreign Corporation control share acquisition act which allows
foreign corporations that have their principal place of business, their
principal office or substantial assets or real property within Louisiana,
that meet the above ten percent/ten thousand shareholder requirements
51. The Louisiana fair price provisions are based on the original Maryland fair price
act. Compare La. R.S. 12:132-134 (1991) with Md. Corps. & Ass'ns Code Ann. §§ 3-
601 to 603 (1985).
52. 1984 La. Acts. No. 841.
53. La. R.S. 12:135-140.2 (Supp. 1990). Louisiana adopted the Indiana version of
the Ohio control share acquisition statute practically word for word. Rohwedder, The
Louisiana Control Share Acquisition Law, 35 La. Bar J. 258, 258 (1986); Morris, De-
velopments in the Law 1986-87, Business Associations, 49 La. L. Rev. 277, 281 (1988)
[hereinafter Morris 1988].
54. La. R.S. 12:140.11-.17 (Supp. 1990).
55. La. R.S. 12:132-134 (Supp. 1990).
56. La. R.S. 12:92(G) (Supp. 1990).
57. Under La. R.S. 12:51(C) and 12:56(B) (Supp. 1990), management is now allowed
to issue securities with unequal rights to shareholders with approval by a simple majority
of the board of directors. Under prior law, the issuance of unequal rights or stock had
to be approved by two-thirds of the board of directors, and if an insider was involved
by a majority of shareholders.
58. Author interview with redactor of one statute.
59. La. R.S. 12:135(4) (Supp. 1990).
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to be protected by the control share acquisition statute.6° The only
requirement for the application for the fair price, expanded fiduciary
duty, and poison pill statutes is a Louisiana chartered corporation. 6
2. The Application of Statutes
The combination of statutes deters possible takeovers, and provides
several layered defenses in response to takeover offers. First, a share-
holder who acquires one-fifth, one-third, and a majority of the shares
respectively, has no voting rights until a majority of shareholders approve
a resolution granting voting rights.62 The decision whether to allocate
voting rights is supposed to be made within fifty days of the acquisition.
This vote, however, can be delayed almost indefinitely by management. 6
Furthermore, only shareholders who refused to tender in the first place
vote. By definition, these shareholders have indicated they do not want
to sell their shares," although generally the outside bidder will make
his tender offer conditional on the necessary vote. If the acquiring
shareholder does obtain a majority vote, then the corporation's assets
will be depleted because the corporation is obligated to buy out all
remaining shareholders at the highest acquisition price.63
Once the acquiring shareholder has obtained his share votes, he still
may not be able to take control of the corporation. Under the fair price
provisions," a corporation cannot be merged unless eighty percent of
the shares eligible to vote and two-thirds of the disinterested shareholders
60. La. R.S. 12:140.11(4)(a). The Foreign Corporation control share acquisition act
also provides an additional qualifying provision of having two thousand employees residing
in Louisiana. La. R.S. 140.11(4)(a)(iii)(dd). The act is most likely unconstitutional. See
Morris 1988, supra note 53, at 280-85; Pinto, supra note 43, at 755.
61. See La. R.S. 12:132(7) (Supp. 1990).
62. La. R.S. 12:140 (Supp. 1990).
63. Under La. R.S. 138(A)(2) (Supp. 1990), the directors do not have to call a meeting
unless the acquisition is "lawful," usually certain to be disputed. See Morris 1988, supra
note 53, at 295 n.77. Furthermore, they are not required to call a meeting until the
acquiring shareholder has furnished copies of all commitments for his cash financing. Id.
In addition, if the corporation is a public corporation subject to Section 14 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, all applicable proxy materials from the acquiring share-
holder and the target's board of directors must be on file with the SEC before the fifty
day period begins to run. La. R.S. 12:138(B) (Supp. 1990). These delays protect the
incumbent management of the target corporation and make it much more likely that any
hostile tender offer would fail. Morris 1988, supra note 53, at 295.
64. Pound, State Legislation Restricting Takeovers: An Economic Overview [here-
inafter Restricting Takeovers], in Impact of Mergers, supra note 12, at 71.
65. La. R.S. 12:140.2 (Supp. 1990).
66. La. R.S. 12:132-134 (Supp. 1990).
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approve the merger. 67 The vote is very difficult to obtain because of
the high quorums required. 6 Absent a vote, the acquiring shareholder
is required to buy out all remaining shareholders at a price calculated
according to a complicated formula, normally resulting in a higher price
paid than the original acquiring price. 69
The most cynical aspect of the control share acquisition acts and
the fair price act is that management is allowed to waive the requirements
of each statute. 70 If management approves of the takeover, then no
super majority votes, no mandatory redemptions, and no expensive delays
are required. Anti-takeover acts, supposedly enacted to protect share-
holders, place the shareholder's welfare at the mercy of management,
the group with the most conflicts with shareholders and the ability to
take advantage of those conflicts. 71
The other Louisiana anti-takeover provisions help insulate the cor-
poration's officers and board of directors from liability for making
decisions that conflict with their duty to shareholders by either turning
down or obstructing beneficial offers to shareholders. 7 The expanded
fiduciary duty amendment allows management to justify almost any act
on the basis of one or another economic or social rationale. 73 Further-
67. La. R.S. 12:133 (Supp. 1990). An "interested shareholder" is defined under the
statute as a shareholder who beneficially owns 10% or more of the stock of the company
excepting the corporation's employee plans and trusts. La. R.S. 12:132(9)(a) (Supp. 1990).
Interestingly enough, employee and pension plan administrators and trustees are normally
appointed by management.
68. La. R.S. 12:74 (Supp. 1990).
69. La. R.S. 12:134(B) (Supp. 1990). See Morris, Developments in the Law 1985-86,
Business Associations, 46 La. L. Rev. 413, 424-25 n.53 (1986).
70. Under La. R.S. 12:134(C)(1) (Supp. 1990), management can waive the protections
of the fair price statute no matter what the consideration, subject only to the very limited
constraints of the business judgment rule, which has been further watered down by the
expanded fiduciary duty statute, La. R.S. 12:92(G) (Supp. 1990). Under La. R.S. 70:135(d)(v)
(Supp. 1990), the control share acquisition act does not apply to mergers approved by
management. Some state versions of anti-takeover statutes do not allow the directors to
waive the protections of the statute. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-9-02 (1990).
71. Pound, The Effects of Antitakeover Amendments on Takeover Activity: Some
Direct Evidence, 30 J. Law. & Econ. 353, 354-55 (1987) [hereinafter Direct Evidence].
72. The theory behind the amendment is that directors in considering these additional
social factors will be able to approve defensive measures against hostile takeovers without
violating the business judgment rule or their fiduciary duty to the corporation or the
shareholders. See Morris 1988, supra note 53, at 288.
73. La. R.S. 12:92(G) (Supp. 1990) reads as follows:
G. The board of directors, when evaluating a tender offer or an offer to make
a tender or exchange offer or to effect a merger or consolidation may, in
exercising its judgment in determining what is in the best interest of the cor-
poration and its shareholders, consider the following factors and any other
factors which it deems relevant:
(1) Not only the consideration being offered in the proposed transaction in
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more, the poison pill amendment allows management to issue poison
pills that will defeat a proposed tender offer without shareholder ap-
proval.7 4
B. The Effect of Anti-Takeover Statutes
The effect of these statutes, as one Louisiana anti-takeover supporter
recognized, "virtually forces a person intending to gain control of an
issuing public corporatiort to negotiate his acquisition with the corpor-
ation's board of directors. '""7 In combination with the liberal business
judgment rule, anti-takeover statutes make it very difficult to successfully
take over a company. 76
relation to the then current market price for the outstanding capital stock of
the corporation, but also the market price for the capital stock of the corporation
over a period of years, the estimated price that might be achieved in a negotiated
sale of the corporation as a whole or in part or through orderly liquidation,
the premiums over market price for the securities of other corporations in similar
transactions, current political, economic, and other factors bearing on securities
prices and the corporation's financial condition and future prospects.
(2) The social and economic effects of such transaction on the corporation, its
subsidiaries, or their employees, customers, creditors, and the communities in
which the corporation and its subsidiaries do business.
(3) The business and financial conditions and earnings prospects of the acquiring
party or parties, including, but not limited to, debt service and other existing
or likely financial obligations of the acquiring party or parties, and the possible
effect of such conditions upon the corporation and its subsidiaries and the
communities in which the corporation and its subsidiaries do business.
(4) The competence, experience, and integrity of the acquiring party or parties
and its or their management.
There are strong arguments against this type of provision. These statutes in
effect give management the right to allocate resources that traditionally were
decided by elected officials. For discussion see Takeover Dangers, supra note
15, at 313-39. Corporate management is selected to maximize returns on invested
capital and not to protect "stakeholders" from takeover activity. Id. at 330.
74. La. R.S. 12:51(C), :56(B) (Supp. 1990). Corporations that adopt poison pills
increase the likelihood of defeating a hostile tender offer from 23%10 to 47%. Weidenbaum,
supra note 24, at 153 (citing Ryngaert, The Effects of Poison Pills on the Wealth of
Shareholders, Securities and Exchange Commission Staff Paper, September 5, 1985 at 36-
37).
75. Rohwedder, supra note 53, at 259. See also Gilmer and Newlin, The Pennsylvania
Shareholder Protection Act: A New State Approach to Deflecting Corporate Takeover
Bids, 40 Bus. Law. 111, 121 (1984).
The requirement of a supermajority to accomplish certain changes in the cor-
poration ... will raise the offeror's cost of acquiring control, will make takeover
difficult or impossible when management controls enough stock to block the
vote even if the offeror buys out all other shareholders, and may enable
management to arrange a friendly acquisition.
Id.
76. Comment, Takeover Dangers and Non-Shareholders: Who Should Be Our Broth-
ers' Keeper?, Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 301, 303-04 (1988); Steinberg, supra note 1, at 10.
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The takeover statutes also dramatically increase the transaction cost
of a takeover. 77 The difference in price between a transaction approved
by management and one not approved is substantial. The difference in
value creates an economic incentive for management to hold out for a
side payment before approving the merger. 7 The payment of an incentive
to management will be economically rational to the acquiring shareholder
as long as it does not exceed the difference between the market price.
and real value of the corporation's assets.
The incentive can consist, for example, of parachute payments, long
term employment contracts, or bonuses. The source for these "incen-
tives" for management is the shareholder's unrealized value in the com-
pany. Management is getting payments from value that was not transferred
to the shareholders prior to the acquisition because of management's
own greed, satisficing, and retention of earnings. 79 The result of anti-
takeover statutes is to give at least some of the unrealized value of the
target company to the management. These economic incentives to man-
agement represent a transfer of wealth to management from the cor-
poration and the shareholders.
The increased transaction costs also create a cushion for manage-
ment. As long as management keeps corporate waste and inefficiency
below the transaction costs of a takeover, there is almost no way to
replace them. 0 The anti-takeover statutes insulate management from
shareholders and remove any remaining accountability that might have
remained.8 ' Furthermore, the broad fiduciary duties assigned management
give management a much broader role in our society than simply con-
trolling the corporation.8 2 Management which is not responsive to the
shareholders or any other constituency is granted the power to make
decisions for the good of our society as a whole. The problem is that
management is not qualified to make these policy decisions; moreover,
management was never elected and lacks political legitimacy. 3
77. See Hackl, supra note 10, at 1203.
78. See, e.g., Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 Va. L. Rev.
111, 116 (1987).
79. See Comment, supra note 44, at 435; Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection,
and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251, 287-88 (1977); Gilson, A
Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers,
33 Stan. L. Rev. 819, 837 (1981); Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 10, at 1170.
80. See infra notes 226-29; Morris 1988, supra note 53, at 313.
81. See, e.g., Sell, A Critical Analysis of a New Approach to State Takeover Leg-
islation After MITE, 23 Washburn L.J. 473, 476 (1984); Thompson, supra note 41, at
87.
82. See supra note 73.
83. See Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 Stan. L. Rev.
1, 28-30 (1979).
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The directors and officers of the corporation in fact become a
political institution making decisions traditionally made by elected leaders
in the United States, but with no similar accountability." Devices such
as the board of directors and outside directors have failed to interject
independence from management or make corporations publicly account-
able."3 Although impartial evaluation of non-shareholder interests is pos-
sible, the target directors lack political legitimacy. 86
1. Economic Effects
The economic effects of anti-takeover amendments are clear. Share-
holders lose money. Takeover attempts are deterred, and higher prem-
iums for offers for companies are required. The overall effect is the
increase of management power and the increase in the required level of
management waste of corporate assets before fear of being replaced will
moderate management behavior.
Anti-takeover statutes increase the transaction costs of taking over
a corporation. Studies have calculated that the Williams Act87 increased
the average premium paid to shareholders to acquire a corporation twenty
percentage points, while corresponding first generation state legislation
increased the necessary premium another twenty percentage points. 88 This
conclusion was supported by another study that found the Williams Act
84. Takeover Dangers, supra note 15, at 316-17 (citing M. Friedman, Capitalism and
Freedom 133-34 (1962)). See Gilson, supra note 79, at 862-65.
85. It is commonly recognized that the board of directors for all intents and purposes
is controlled by management. See Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or
Potemkin Village?, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 597, 610-11 (1982); Palmiter, Reshaping the Corporate
Fiduciary Model: A Director's Duty of Independence, 67 Tex. L. Rev. 1351, 1438-40
(1989); Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation:
Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 Calif. L. Rev. 375, 382 (1975); Takeover Dangers,
supra note 15, at 317. See also Gilson, supra note 79, at 865. Sometimes management's
control of the outside board is less discrete. In the RJR Nabisco-KKR LBO an "outside"
director's compensation as a "consultant" was increased from $250,000 to $500,00 three
weeks before the management group made an LBO offer for RJR Nabisco. The "outside"
director was a top advisor to F. Ross Johnson, the CEO of RJR that bid for the company.
Wall Street J., Dec. 8, 1988, at A4.
86. Takeover Dangers, supra note 15, at 316.
87. The Williams Act regulates the tender offer process, and was enacted to curb
perceived takeover abuses in the 1960's. Johnson and Millon, Misreading the Williams
Act, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1862, 1893-97 (1989).
88. Cook, What the Economics Literature Has to Say About Takeovers, in Chilton,
supra note 15, at 17 (citing Jarrell and Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and
State Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 23 Journal of Law and Economics 371, 393
(1980)); DeAngelo and Rice, Anti-Takeover Charter Amendments and Stockholder Wealth,
11 Journal of Financial Economics, 329, 336 (1983)). However, another comprehensive
study of takeovers between 1981 and 1986 found that second generation anti-takeover
statutes did not increase the control premium paid. Hackl, supra note 10, at 1229.
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increased the premium thirteen percent and state anti-takeover legislation
increased the required premium another twenty percent.8 9
Four studies of the effects of recent anti-takeover amendments on
shareholder welfare in individual states have been made. All have found
significant decreases in shareholder wealth as a result of the enactment
of the statutes. An SEC study found that Ohio shareholders lost $1.45
billion, a 3.24% average decline in share value, with the passage of
Ohio's anti-takeover bill.9 Another study for the Federal Trade Com-
mission found that the enactment of New York's anti-takeover statute
created an average one percent across the board decrease in share value
of New York firms causing a $1.2 billion loss to shareholders. 9' The
same results were found in an Indiana study; shareholders lost $2.65
billion or six percent of the total value of Indiana companies when
Indiana adopted a control share acquisition act.92
Studies of anti-takeover corporate amendments have found similar
evidence that particular anti-takeover amendments to corporate charters
reduced the share price of the firm and increased the success of com-
panies in resisting tender offers.93
In a study of cash tender offers for 242 target corporations from
June 1, 1981 through December 31, 1986, 94 the authors found, as ex-
pected, the number of successful as well as the number of total bids
also decreased as a result of anti-takeover legislation.95 In addition, the
89. Hackl, supra note 10, at 1208 (citing Guerin-Calvert, McGuckin & Warren-
Boulton, State and Federal Regulation in the Market for Corporate Control (Jan. 21,
1986) (Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper on file with the Yale Law Journal).
See also infra text accompanying notes 100-01.
90. Office of the Chief Economist, Securities and Exchange Commission, Shareholder
Wealth Effects of Ohio Legislation Affecting Takeovers, reported in Ohio Companies
Stock Prices Dropped after Takeover Defenses were Bolstered, 19 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. 741
(BNA) (1987). The bill was passed in response to a takeover bid by Sir James Goldsmith
for Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
91. FTC Report Says New York Takeover Law Reduced Stock Value, 19 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. 596 (BNA) (1987).
92. Woodward, How Much Indiana's Anti-Takeover Law Cost Shareholders, Wall
St. J., May 5, 1988, at 32. The fourth study, conducted in a student note, concluded
that shareholders of Minnesota and Massachusetts had significant negative returns as a
result of an enactment of an anti-takeover statute. Note, Sword or Shield: The Impact
of Third-Generation State Takeover Statutes on Shareholder Wealth, 57 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 958, 980-84 (1989).
93. Hackl, supra note 10, at 1210-11 (citing Pound, supra note 71).
94. Hackl, supra note 10, at 1212.
95. Id at 1231. There is also some evidence of anti-takeover statutes between 1972-
1978 that found that states with these statutes had 8.5%Io fewer tender offers, but the
these results are subject to criticism. Id. at 1209 (citing Smiley, The Effect of State
Securities Statutes on Tender Offer Activity, 19 Econ. Inquiry 426 (1981)). This is also
consistent with earlier studies of anti-takeover amendments to corporate charters. See
Direct Evidence, supra note 71, at 367.
19911
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
same study found that anti-takeover statutes did not increase the number
of auctions where more than one offeror bid for the company.9 The
study concluded at best that the second generation statutes did not help
shareholders and at worse caused a significant decline in shareholder
welfare.
97
The study showed that the number of tender offers increased in all
states; however, in absolute terms, the offers increased approximately
twice as fast in states without second generation statutes. 9 Even when
calculated as a percentage of publicly traded firms, the rate of increase
still remained about forty percent higher in states without anti-takeover
statutes. 99 The raw data also suggests that the enactment of second
generation statutes also increased the likelihood that a tender offer would
fail.100
Anti-takeover statutes may increase premiums paid to shareholders,
but the overall increase in premium is probably offset by the decreased
number of successful offers and the higher transaction costs induced by
the anti-takeover statutes. The statutes do not further goals such as
encouraging auctions for firms and protecting shareholders. To the con-
trary, the statutes entrench management and encourage the waste of
corporate assets through inefficiency and side payments to management.
V. THE IMPETUS FOR ANTI-TAKEOVER STATUTES
A. The Real Politics
1. Corporation Specific Statutes
Almost universally, states initially adopted anti-takeover statutes in
response to a single local corporation that was the target of a hostile
96. Hackl, supra note 10, at 1231.
97. Id. at 1230.
98. Id. at 1215. In second generation states tender offers increased 38.46%, while in
states without second generation statutes tender offers increased 85.71°70. The increase
relative to publicly traded firms for second generation states was 1.54% and states without
second generation statutes was 2.46%. The data was also broken down by type of study.
Tender offers increased in states enacting fair price provisions 07o and 0%, respectively,
states enacting control share statutes 33.330o and 0.84%, states enacting shareholder
demand statutes 400% and 6.66%. Id. at 1216.
99. Id.
100. Accounting for other outside factors Hackl and Testani found that tender offers
for firms in second generation states were 5.280o less successful while in non-second
generation states they were only .18% less successful, but the increase may not be
statistically significant. Id. at 1219, Table 4. The number of successful offers in non-
second generation states increased 14.78% over the sample period while the number of
takeovers in second-generation states decreased 8.33%. Id. at 1218, Table 3.
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bid or was apprehensive that it could become a target. 0' In at least
nineteen states, anti-takeover statutes were passed at the behest of a
single corporation. 1 2 These statutes are usually not discussed or debated
and are adopted with no support or opposition from business, labor,
or other groups. 03 They usually are drafted by the target corporation's
attorneys at the behest of management.'0 4
Indiana is a good example of this trend. Indiana passed its version
of a control share acquisition statute with no debate in direct response
to a hostile offer for Arvin Industries by Belzberg Brothers. The statute
was drafted, enacted, and signed into law in four weeks. 05 Pennsylvania,
another example, adopted its second generation statute between Thanks-
giving and Christmas of 1983 in response to a bid for Scott Industries.' °6
The lack of public discussion and the speed of its passage were char-
acterized as necessary to prevent political opposition.,07 There are literally
dozens of examples.10 s
101. Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion, 57
U. Cinn. L. Rev. 457, 461 (1988) [hereinafter Future of Hostile Takeovers].
102. See id. at 461; Davis, Epilogue: The Role of the Hostile Takeover and the Role
of the States, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 491, 492. A list of the states and the responsible
corporation follows: Ariz. (Greyhound), Conn. (Aetna), Fla. (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich),
Ill. (unidentified), Ind. (Arvin Industries), Ky. (Ashland Oil), La. (unidentified, author
interview with redactor), Me. (unidentified), Md. (Martin Marietta), Mass. (Gillette), Minn.
(Dayton Hudson), Mo. (TWA), N.Y. (CBS), N.C. (Burlington Industries), Ohio (Goodyear
Tire & Rubber, Federated Dept. Stores), Okla. (Unocal), Pa. (Scott Paper), Wash. (Boeing,
Weyerhauser), Wis. (Heileman Brewing Co.). Id.; Romano, supra note 101, at 462 n.l 1.
103. Butler, Corporation-Specific Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Market for Corporate
Charters, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 365, 366. For example, in Louisiana the Louisiana Association
of Business and Industry (the LABI) took no position on the various anti-takeover statutes
passed. Author interview. The Connecticut statute was likewise not supported or opposed
by anybody except for Aetna, CBIA, and the corporate bar. See Romano, supra note
78, at 134. There are exceptions. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 102, at 493-97 (describing
Wisconsin's experience in enacting anti-takeover statutes). More recently other groups
outside the immediate corporation have lobbied for anti-takeover statutes as the competition
to provide the most protection for corporate management has increased.
104. See, e.g., Kimmins, Private Decisions Speed Federated Bill Through the House,
Business First-Columbus, Feb. 15, 1988, at 10; Cusick, Bill Allows Pa. Firms to Add to
Defenses, Philadelphia Inquirer, Mar. 24, 1988; Author interview with bill's drafter (Louis-
iana).
105. Bloomenthal, Control Share Acquisitions-Part II, 9 Sec. & Fed. Corp. L. Rep.
49, 49-50 (Clark Boardmans) (1987).
106. Newlin and Gilmer, The Pennsylvania Shareholder Protection Act: A New State
Approach to Deflecting Corporate Takeover Bids, 40 Bus. Law. 111, 112 (1984).
107. Id.
108. Ohio's latest takeover bills (February 1988), passed to protect Federated De-
partment Stores from a hostile bid from Campeau Corp, were debated in two hearings
for four and eight minutes respectively. Kimmins, supra note 104, at 10. All talks regarding
the bill were held in private. Eventually, only one bill was passed, but this was because
the Ohio legislature was afraid that one of the bills was so expansive that Ohio's other
anti-takeover statutes would be made unconstitutional. Id.
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2. "Race to the Bottom"
Recently the impetus for most states' adoption of anti-takeover
statutes is the fear that a domestic corporation will choose to reincor-
porate or even move its headquarters to take advantage of another
state's anti-takeover protection.109 The greed of states in trying to attract
other states' corporations also is influential.'10 For example, State A
enacts a takeover statute that provides more protections for corporate
management because State B has enacted a more protective statute. If
State A does not enact a tougher statute, then State A may lose some
of its corporations. Furthermore, if State A does enact a tougher statute,
then State A has the potential to attract some of State B's corporations.
This is the classic "race to the bottom" that has occurred in state
corporate law since the early twentieth century."'
For example, Delaware enacted an anti-takeover statute because
Delaware corporations threatened to reincorporate in other states if
Delaware did not enact the statute." 2 In addition, Delaware's state
government saw the enactment of the statute as a way to attract revenues
for the state.' Ohio also adopted its second takeover statute as a way
of avoiding corporate flight, ' 4 and Connecticut passed anti-takeover
legislation in response to direct threats by firms located there to move
their state of incorporation if the laws were not passed." 5 The com-
petition for state corporate charters has become so fierce that it prompted
the American Bar Association (ABA) and the North American Securities
Administrators Association (NASAA) to adopt a model control share
acquisition act" 6 to limit the competition and stop the "race to the
109. Bamonte, The Dynamics of State Protectionism: A Short Critique of the CTS
Decision, 8 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 259, 262 (1988). See also Romano, The State Competition
Debate in Corporate Law, 8 Cardozo L. Rev. 709 (1987).
110. See, e.g., Talbott, Ohio Takeover Laws May Lure Businesses, Plain Dealer
(Cleveland, Ohio), Feb. 14, 1988 (Bus. 18:D9).
111. See, e.g., Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
Yale L. J. 663 (1974); Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251, 254-57 (1977); J. Seligman, The Transformation of
Wall Street (1982).
112. Delaware May Staunch Leveraged Takeovers, Investment Dealer's Dig., Nov. 23,
1987, at 47; Sontag, A Takeover Law Grows in Delaware, Nat'l L. J., Apr. 11, 1988,
at 1; Barrett, Delaware Moves Closer to Adopting Law to Deter Hostile Takeovers, Wall
St. J., Dec. 9, 1987, at 41, col. 4.
113. See, e.g., Montgomery, Takeover Law Seen Paying Off for State, Evening Journal
(Wilmington, Del.), Mar. 4, 1988 (fifty major corporation's moved their incorporation to
Delaware increasing Delaware's tax revenue $5 million).
114. Talbott, supra note 110.
115. Vogelstein, Bill Would Stop New Owner from Stripping Firm of Assets, Haven
Register (New Haven, Conn.), Feb. 7, 1988 (Bus. 18:D5).
116. Model State Control Share Statute, NASAA Rep. (CCH) 4951-4960 (Apr. 22,
1988).
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bottom."1 7 Unfortunately, the model act has had little influence to date.
States are not shy in expressing the purposes behind the statutes.
A Wyoming state senator, selling his state's most recent anti-takeover
law allowing a subsidiary to retain up to forty percent of the stock of
its parent, claimed "just 10 percent more shares, [and] management can
firmly control the shares of [their] corporation.""'  The senator explained
the measure as a way to attract corporate business to Wyoming." 9 One
state even kept a running tally of how many domestic corporations had
taken over outside corporations and vice versa. A Wisconsin newspaper
jubilantly proclaimed that Wisconsin corporations had taken over $250
million more worth of out-of-state corporations than out-of-state cor-
porations had taken out of Wisconsin. 20
3. Anti-takeover Statutes as Amendments to the Corporate
Charter
As with previous "races to the bottom" in corporate law, the state
competition in anti-takeover laws has increased the power and control
of management and at the same time limited the power of shareholders.' 2
The evidence supports that states have again abdicated any responsibility
to shareholders in response to pressure from management.' 22 What is
most disturbing, however, is that management could have obtained the
same protections from amendments to their corporate charter. Manage-
ment instead chose the legislative process because it did not require a
vote of their own shareholders.
Management has essentially lobbied their respective state governments
to legislatively amend their corporate charter to avoid the required
117. Gruber, Patzik, and Choate, The Model State Control Share Statute of the North
American Securities Administrators, 44 Bus. Law. 577, 578-79 (1988) (citing Sachnoff,
Bamonte & Kaprelian, Resisting the Race to the Bottom: Why the Illinois Legislature
Should Reject New Anti-Takeover Laws, 76 Ill. B.J. 554 (1988)).
118. Lazarus, Scott: Anti-Takeover Laws Make Wyoming a Corporate Haven, Casper
Star-Tribune, April 20, 1989.
119. Id.
120. Wisconsin Winner, in '86 Acquisitions, Milwaukee Sentinel, Feb. 10, 1987; Malm-
gren and Pelisek, Take-Overs of Wisconsin Corporations, 57 Wis. Bar Bull. 26 (1984)
(Wisconsin must enact anti-takeover statutes because out-of state corporations are taking
over Wisconsin corporations).
121. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation,
6 J. Legal Stud. 251, 255 (1977).
122. Sell, supra note 81, at 479. This is essentially what happened previously. See
Winter, supra note 121, at 255 n.14, citing Corporation Law Reform Commission of
New Jersey, Report, in N.J. Stat. Ann., tit. 14A, at x-xi (1969) ("It is clear that the
major protections to investors . . .have come, and must continue to come, from Federal
legislation, . . . Any attempt to provide such regulations ... through state incorporation
acts ... would only drive corporations out of the state to more hospitable jurisdictions.").
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shareholder approval. An important implication of the state anti-takeover
laws is that corporate management can obtain protection from replace-
ment that would not have been adopted by the shareholders if they had
the opportunity to vote. 23
Some states originally considered statutes that would have required
shareholder approval before the corporation's management would have
been protected, but these statutes have been rejected after strong lobbying
by management groups. For example, the first draft of the Delaware
anti-takeover law would have only applied to corporations after the
shareholders had voted to opt into the statute's coverage. 24 The legis-
lature, however, rejected the bill after strong pressure from management
groups. 25 The next year the shareholder approval provisions were written
out and the bill passed.' 26
Also, anti-takeover statutes that would subject management to the
same controls as outside bidders are usually rejected. The Maryland
legislature's first version of their "fair price" anti-takeover statute would
have regulated friendly mergers and acquisitions. Corporate management
pressured Maryland's Governor Hughes to oppose the bill and he re-
sponded with his veto. 27 The amended "fair price" bill was passed later
that year without requiring shareholder approval of management-led
mergers. 128
In one study of Connecticut's adoption of an anti-takeover statute,
the author found that the introduction of a "fair price" anti-takeover
statute by management of Aetna Life Insurance Company may have
been less expensive and had a higher chance of success than trying to
get shareholder approval. 29 The legislature probably passed the bill more
quickly than shareholder approval could have been obtained. Moreover,
Aetna avoided the probability that shareholders would not have passed
the charter amendment. 30
123. Romano, supra note 78, at 113.
124. Romano, supra note 101, at 463.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Letter of Hon. Harry Hughes to Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin at 2 (May 31, 1983)
reprinted in Maryland Department of Legislative Research, Staff Report to the General
Assembly of Maryland on Corporations and Associations: Consideration of the Problem
of Special Voting Requirements in Consolidations, Mergers, Takeovers and Transfers of
Assets at 49, 50 (1983). See also Bainbridge, State Takeover and Tender Offer Regulations
Post-MITE: The Maryland, Ohio and Pennsylvania Attempts, 90 Dick. L. Rev. 731, 744
(1986).
128. Bainbridge, supra note 127, at 744-45.
129. Romano, supra note 78, at 128-31.
130. Id. at 129-31. Aetna also avoids looking hypocritical as it is also a large investor
in other corporation's stocks and may have voted down anti-takeover charter amendments.
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The role of corporate management in promoting anti-takeover sta-
tutes cannot be denied. In many cases the sole sponsor of an anti-
takeover statute is a single corporation.' a' It is also clear that anti-
takeover statutes are nothing more than legislative enactments of typical
anti-takeover charter amendments. 3 2 Management is using the state leg-
islative process to provide management job protection presumably not
provided by their own shareholders.' Management is able to prevail
in the state legislature because the concentration of management in the
state will always outnumber the dispersed shareholders. 34 These initial
forays led by management have now led to a "race to the bottom,"
and states are now almost compelled to adopt management protective
legislation to keep local corporation charters and headquarters.'35
B. Justifications Offered for Such Bills
The economics behind anti-takeover statutes vividly demonstrates the
influence and bias of management in these statutes. Even though many
state statutes were passed because of the influence of a single corporation,
the legislatures usually adopt some political rhetoric supporting the re-
spective statute. 3 6 This rhetoric does not reflect the economic realities
131. See supra text accompanying note 102.
132. See Hackl, supra note 10, at 1203.
133. See Coffee, The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders,
Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 435, 460; Macey, State Anti-Takeover
Legislation and the National Economy, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 467, 471; Butler, supra note
103, at 367.
134. Butler, supra note 103, at 367.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Preamble to Wisconsin Control Share Acquisition Act, 1983 Wis. Act
200 1:
Tender offers are coercive because of individual shareholder concern that a
majority of shareholders will tender their shares, leaving those who do not in
a vulnerable minority position. Shareholders thus feel compelled to tender their
shares, regardless of their position on corporate control. The opportunity for
reasoned decision making is further hindered by the short time tender offers
may remain open and the fact that individual shareholders typically receive or
obtain tender offer materials much later than institutional shareholders. This
structuring of tender offerees is designed to coerce individual shareholders into
tendering their shares quickly and without deliberation.
Successful tender offers often disrupt existing businesses, causing unemployment,
relocation of business operations and other economically depressing effects on
the affected community.
It is in the public interest to provide protections for domestic corporation
shareholders in the transfer of corporate control, regardless of the method of
transfer. These protections must afford the shareholders the opportunity to
consider tender offers in a deliberate manner, free from coercion, similar to
current law providing for shareholder approval in other transfers of control
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of mergers and acquisitions and disguises the fact that the one group
that needs no special protection, management, is receiving the benefits
from these statutes.
1. Public Opinion
Generally, public opinion has played a very small role in the passage
of anti-takeover statutes. Overall, the public has very little cognizance
of takeovers, and the little awareness they may have is usually incor-
rect.137 There is, nevertheless, a slight negative tilt to public opinion
regarding takeovers, which is probably reflected in state elected officials'
own opinions. The public is generally confused regarding the economics
and effects of mergers and acquisitions."'
The public is generally indifferent to takeovers, but leans towards
a negative opinion.' The public usually identified shareholders and
This act is necessary to protect shareholders from fraudulent and manipulative
attempts at transfer of corporate control and to ensure shareholder opportunity
to approve transfer of control in a deliberate manner ...
137. See Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra note 101, at 497-98. This misinformation
has been created, in part, through the active public relations campaigns corporate man-
agement has waged. See supra note 12; see also Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra note
101, at 495.
138. See Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra note 101, at 495. This misinformation
has been spread throughout by popular media. See, e.g., Brickey, Storm of Take-Overs
and Buy-Outs Has Hit Toledo Often in Last 5 Years, The Blade (Toledo, Ohio) Feb.
11, 1987 (Bus. 17:B5) (Toledo newspaper described local takeovers as a battle and each
company that was taken over or restructured as a loss. The newspaper characterize
payments to shareholders as costs, not as positive cash flows to shareholders.).
139. These negative responses are probably heightened because the surveys typically
refer to large mergers and big corporations-both of which tend to elicit a negative
response from the general public. Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra note 101, at 493-
94. A summary of the poll's results regarding public feelings toward takeovers is included
in the table below. Id. at 493.
Poll Responses (%): Mergers and the Country/Economy
Poll Good Bad No. Diff. Don't Know
1. 1988, Penn & Schoen# 13 63 - 22
2. 1987 ABC/Money Mag. 20 36 31 13
3. 1987 Harris/Bus.Wk. 16 45 34 -
4. 1987 NBC/Wall St.J. 35 46 5 14
5. 1986 ABC/Wash. Post 24 37 31 8
6. 1985 Opinion Research* 25 41 16 17
7. 1984 Roper 30 52 - 18
8. 1983 Opinion Research* 21 53 14 12
# Poll was conducted for the Coalition to Stop the Raid Against America.
* The Opinion Research polls used slightly different terms than the other polls cited.
Opinion Research answer qualifiers were respectively: "Beneficial", "Hinders," "No ef-
fect" and "Don't Know."
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executives as winners and workers as losers in takeovers.' 40 Over three-
quarters of the public surveyed had little or no knowledge of takeovers. 4
The results from a Louis Harris poll in 1987 graphically illustrate
the confusion in the public's mind. Seventy-one percent said that realizing
full potential value for shareholders should be the top priority for
American industry, seventy-six percent said takeovers keep management
on its toes, and forty-nine percent said that hostile takeovers often result
in real improvements of management. 42 Yet fifty-eight percent said
hostile takeovers do more harm than good, seventy-eight percent said
that employees, the community, and the economy are more important
than shareholders. 43 The general public tends not to trust corporate
management or shareholders, and seems to like takeovers for their
regulatory effects on management, but dislikes them because of the
possibility of economic dislocations.
Public perceptions, however, are out-of-line with economic reali-
ties.'" A substantial majority, over sixty percent, believed that the share-
holders and management of the acquiring corporation benefited from a
merger, while only forty-five percent thought that shareholders and
management of the target firm benefited. 14 Most importantly, a majority
of respondents believed that mergers reduced employment.'" With the
majority of the public either indifferent or negative to takeovers, there
is little opposition to anti-takeover legislation by local electorates. 147
2. Protection of Shareholders
What is clear is that, although most anti-takeover statutes are jus-
tified as protecting shareholders,'4 anti-takeover laws are the antithesis
140. Id. at 491. Romano examined twenty-four polls. Twenty-three were conducted in
the 1980's and one was conducted in the 1950's. The accuracy of the polls ranged between
3016 and 5%.
141. Id.
142. Louis Harris & Associates, Inc. survey commissioned by the Institute of Private
Enterprise at the University of North Carolina of 1,751 adults in Markey Urges Congress
to Adopt Comprehensive Takeover Package, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at
472 (Apr. 3, 1987).
143. Id.
144. See Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra note 101, at 495.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 497.
148. See, for example, Indiana's Governor, Robert D. Orr's defense of anti-takeover
statutes in an editorial in the Wall Street Journal. Governor Orr defended his state's
enactment of the anti-takeover statute in defense of Arvin Industries. In a letter, Governor
Orr offers no less than six separate defenses of his anti-takeover bill: one, limit short-
term focus of management and encourage long term investment, two, protect shareholders
from partial tender offers, three, protect shareholders from the "prisoner's dilemma" in
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of shareholder protection . 49 The evidence is uncontroverted that tak-
eovers, leveraged buyouts, and related transactions provide large prem-
iums to shareholders.' 50 Furthermore, the whole market for corporate
control has increased the market value of corporate stock.', Corporate
takeovers, despite the rhetoric of anti-takeover statutes, have consistently
produced significant gains for shareholders.
Shareholders of target corporations 5 2 that were acquired or restruc-
tured generally have done very well. 5 Shareholders of target corporations
have received a minimum of $167 billion between 1981 and 1986 from
takeovers and takeover related transactions.1 4 The average premium
above the market price received by shareholders in these takeovers has
ranged from seventy-one percent to thirty-six percent, depending on the
year, "'55 and have generally been the same whether the tender offer was
tendering their shares, four, the internal affairs doctrine, five, the need to create a "playing
field level for all players in a hostile takeover," and six, the need to protect minority
shareholders. Although his primary focus was on coercive two step takeovers. In the
words of the Governor, "The Indiana law is the first in America to give long term
growth a fighting chance against short term 'profiteering."' Orr, Shareholders Need a
Knight-Errant, Wall St. J., May 27, 1987, at 30, col. 3.
149. Butler, supra note 103, at 367; Sell, supra note 81, at 479; Davis, supra note
102, at 512-13. See also, Roll, Empirical Evidence on Takeover Activity and Shareholder
Wealth, in Coffee, supra note 9, at 241.
150. See infra text accompanying notes 152-61.
151. See infra text accompanying notes 162-69.
152. A "target" company refers to a company that is the subject of a takeover bid,
Steinberg, supra note 3, at 260.
153. See generally Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter, The Market for Corporate Control:
The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. of Econ. Persp. 49, 51-53 (1989) [hereinafter
The Market for Corporate Control].
154. Grundfest Says Study Shows Takeovers Sharply Increase Shareholder Wealth, 19
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1487 (Oct. 2, 1987). A good example is Mesa
Petroleum's defeated bid for Unocal. The price for Unocal's common stock increased
38% from twenty days before Mesa's offer to the day Mesa announced its intention to
acquire the company, $34.63 to $48.
155. Control Premiums in Mergers & Acquisitions, Mergers and Acquisitions, Jan/
Feb. 1990, at 77. A table of premiums for 1980-1989 follows.
Average Premiums over Stock Prices 1980-Sept. 1989
(I month before announcement of deal)
Year # of deals # w/Premium Avg. Premium %
1980 1,558 107 70.53
1981 2,328 221 61.36
1982 2,298 228 49.92
1983 2,393 219 48.19
1984 3,172 405 37.02
1985 3,474 392 42.24
1986 4,435 450 36.40
1987 4,003 380 37.85
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an any-or-all or two-tier offer, 5 6 with the premium paid only slightly
reduced in partial offers.' Shareholders received similar premiums in
corporations taken over in a LBO.'
Acquiring corporation shareholders did not have the same returns
as the target corporation shareholders, but generally there were some
gains.5 9 The average return for acquiring corporation shareholders after
the acquisition was four percent. 60 Studies have indicated no evidence
that other security holders of the target or acquiring corporation, such
as bondholders, have losses from takeover transactions, although bond
prices have been depressed after the completion of individual transac-
tions. 16
The 1980's increase in takeovers and mergers also coincided with
record stock market gains. The Standard and Poor 500 Stock Index has
1988 3,793 404 42.65
1989 3,692 339 38.52
Id.
156. A "two-tier offer" is two-step acquisition technique in which the first step (front-
end) is a cash tender offer and the second step (back-end) often is a merger in which
remaining shareholders of the [large] company .. .receive securities of the bidder valued
below the cash consideration offered in the first-step tender offer." Steinberg, supra note
3, at 261.
157. Cook, supra note 88, at 12 (citing R. Comment, The Economics of Any-or-All,
Partial, and Two-Tier Tender Offers, (The Office of the Chief Economist, Securities and
Exchange Commission, 1985)).
158. Shareholders received an average premium of 40%, although the individual prem-
iums accrued on individual offers differed between 1.7 and 120%. Lehn and Poulsen,
Leveraged Buyouts: Wealth Created or Wealth Redistributed, in Chilton, supra note 15,
at 52-53.
159. The Market for Corporate Control, supra note 153, at 53.
160. Cook, What the Economics Literature Has to Say About Takeovers, in Chilton,
supra note 15, at 5 (citing Jensen and Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control, 11
J. Financial Econ. 5 (1983)). There were many cases in which there was no increase in
return at all. Id. In some cases firms lost money as a result of the takeover or merger.
Nevertheless, some commentators believe that the increased value of the acquisition is
already reflected in the share price before the actual acquisition takes place. Id. at 6-8
(citing Schipper and Thompson, Evidence on the Capitalized Value of Merger Activity
for Acquiring Firms, 11 J. Financial Econ. 85 (1983)). A 1986 study found that when
values of senior securities is considered that acquiring firms had net gains as a result of
a merger. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence [hereinafter the
Takeover Controversy], in Coffee, supra note 9, at 314, 316.
Earlier studies found that acquiring firms almost universally reduced their earnings ratios
after an acquisition. E. Magenheim and D. Mueller, Are Acquiring-Firm Shareholders
Better Off after an Acquisition, in Coffee, supra note 9, at 171-89. Magenheim and
Mueller's article studied 78 acquisitions from 1976 through 1981, and also reviewed nine
other studies of the effect of acquisitions.
161. See The Market for Corporate Control, supra note 153, at 56-57; see also Lehn
& Poulsen, Sources of Value in Leveraged Buyouts, in Chilton, supra note 15, at 55-58.
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consistently risen throughout the 1980's.162 Nevertheless, these gains have
been mostly attributable to the effects of mergers and acquisitions.1 63
As a result of the stock market gains, stock prices now reflect seventy-
five percent of American corporation's actual asset replacement value
due to takeovers, as opposed to representing forty percent of the re-
placement value before the wave of current takeovers began. 64
Without takeovers many shareholders would not have realized these
gains. The increase in the stock market and in the premiums paid through
takeovers and related restructuring has not been accompanied by an
increase in the amount of normal dividends 65 paid to shareholders.
Dividends no longer constitute "the primary vehicle for transferring
corporate profits to individual stockholders."'66 In the early 1970's "stock
buybacks and cash mergers equaled about fifteen percent of total div-
idend payments." In 1985 these devices constituted one hundred and
fifty percent of total dividend payments. 67 Dividends, on the other hand,
have remained static, and the dividend price ratio decreased in the
1980'sI6s even while corporate profits continued to increase. 69
A major rationalization for anti-takeover statutes is protection of
shareholders from "coercive" two-tier tender offers. 70 Even though most
162. The S&P 500 index rose as a percent in following years, respectively: 1989,
31.53%; 1988, 17.07%; 1987, 5.23%; 1986, 18.5507o; 1985, 32.03%; 1984, 6.10%; 1983,
22.38%. 1989 Scoreboards, Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1990 at RI, col. 1; 1987 Scoreboards,
Wall St. J., Jan. 2 1988 at RI, col. 1; Investment Scoreboard, Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1985
at 3B, col. 1.
163. One-third of the gain is attributable to restructuring and takeovers, Pickens, The
Stockholder Revolution in Chilton, supra note 15, at 27. A SEC study, as well as the
special White House Task Force on Market Mechanism, found that consideration of
proposed anti-takeover legislation before the House Of Representatives Ways and Means
Committee was the major factor in the October 1987 stock market crash. SEC Staff
Study Blames Market Crash on House Tax Bill's Anti-takeover Items, 21 Sec. Reg. L.
Rep. 658 (BNA) No. 86 (May 5, 1989).
164. Koretz, Economic Trends, The Acquisition Boom has Lost a Lot of its Thunder,
Bus. Wk., June 12, 1989, at 18. This is consistent with economic theory. See Shareholders
versus Managers, infra note 268, at 44.
165. Dividends that are not a result of a corporate restructuring, defensive maneuver
or merger.
166. Koretz, Economic Diary, Wall Street Ponders the Continuing Dearth of Divi-
dends. . ., Bus. Wk., August 3, 1987, at 16.
167. Id.
168. Council of Economic Advisers, Econ. Indicators, Feb. 1990, at 31 [hereinafter
Economic Indicators]. Dividend-price ratios: 1981, 5.20; 1982, 5.81; 1983, 4.40; 1984,
4.64; 1985, 4.25; 1986, 3.49; 1987, 3.08; 1988, 3.64; 1989, 3.45. Id.
169. Economic Indicators, supra note 168, at 4. Corporate profits with inventory
valuation and capital consumption adjustments for the following years in billions of
dollars: 1982, 150.0; 1983, 213.7; 1984, 266.9; 1985, 282.3; 1986, 282.1; 1987, 298.7;
1988, 328.6; 1989, 299.2.
170. See Booth, The Promise of State Takeover Statutes, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 1635,
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offers today are cash, 171 even when two-tier offers were commonly used
shareholders still received substantial gains.' 72 Furthermore, some com-
mentators believe that a prisoner's dilemma never develops because the
market will always develop a competing bid if an offeror tries to under-
value a firm. 73 In fact, shareholders may now be in danger of coercive
offers by management. 74 What is clear is that the deterrence and defeat
of takeovers by anti-takeover statutes is reducing that premium to zero, 75
and shareholders on average actually lost ten percent of their shares'
value when a tender offer was defeated. 76
The bottom line, nevertheless, is that these statutes cannot be share-
holder protective, otherwise management simply would have obtained
shareholder approval instead of going behind the shareholders' back and
having state legislatures amend the corporate charters.
3. Protection of Stakeholders
No evidence shows that hostile takeovers increase economic dislo-
cations. Individual communities may face some dislocations, but no
evidence indicates charitable giving, employment, or quality of life goes
down because of a corporate acquisition. The popular opinion that
takeovers cause harm to communities is probably the consequence of
1637 (1988); Romano, supra note 78, at 117; Shipman, In Defense of Reasonable State
Regulation of Tender Offers, 53 Brooklyn L. Rev. 99, 99-100 (1987); Clarke and Scriggins,
Takeovers and the 1983 Maryland Fair Price Legislation, 43 Md. L. Rev. 266, 267-72
(1984). See also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 82-83, 107 S.Ct.
1637, 1646 (1987).
171. Hostile Two-Tier Tender Offers Fading From Picture, Grundfest Says, supra note
13.
172. Shareholders received a premium of 63.47o in any or all offers, an average
premium of 55.1% in two-tier offers and 31.3% in partial tender offers. SEC, The
Economics of Partial and Two-Tier Tender Offers, reprinted in [1984 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,637 (June 21, 1984).
173. Lehn, Blackwell, and Marr, The Economics of Leveraged Takeovers, 65 Wash.
U.L.Q. 163, 183-84 (1987) and authorities cited therein [hereinafter Blackwell].
174. A SEC Commissioner maintains that most coercive two-tier tender offers originate
with management in either self-tenders or through the solicitation of a friendly merger.
See supra note 13. See for example the selective self-tender by Unocal for only 29% of
the outstanding shares, which was upheld by the Delaware Supreme Court, Unocal v.
Mesa, 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). Unocal's management denied over $1.1 billion in
premiums to Unocal's shareholders, and in effect made a two tier offer where the front-
end of the offer was for $72 for 2907o of the shares and the back-end price of the
remaining 7104 was only $35. Furthermore, Boone Pickens' attempted takeover generated
$2.1 billion in payouts to Unocal's shareholders. See Takeover Controversy, supra note
160, at 345-46.
175. Restricting Takeovers, supra note 64, at 70. See also supra text accompanying
notes 87-100.
176. Ruback, Do Target Shareholders Lose in Unsuccessful Control Contests?, in
Auerbach, supra note 16, at 150.
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widespread public relations work by corporations as well as the impact
a lay-off announcement has on an individual's perception, regardless of
its frequency.' 77 Furthermore, takeover opponents often neglect to con-
sider that the proceeds from a takeover or acquisition are normally
reinvested by target shareholders or used to retire other loans.'7 8
a. Employment
One of the primary concerns regarding takeovers is their effect on
employment. Nevertheless, there is almost no evidence regarding the
effects of takeovers on employment.' 79 Much of the evidence that tak-
eovers reduce employment is anecdotal, and there is no hard evidence
that takeovers cause reduced employment. 1° Many of the industries where
there were in fact job losses were already facing a restructuring in
response to a decline in market demand, international competition, or
government deregulation.' 8 '
In fact, some evidence shows that takeovers increase employment.
One study found that actual employment increased about two percent
as a result of a merger, even though wages dropped about four percent.
1 8 2
Most studies finding decreased employment have focused on LBO's, and
the loss appears due to the effects of leverage rather than change of
control.8 3 But overall, there seems to be no difference in the effects
177. See Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra note 101, at 497.
178. Takeover Dangers, supra note 15, at 308 (Citing Economic Report of the President
(1985) at 201).
179. Corporate Takeovers, supra note 9, at 49.
180. Id. See, e.g., Magnet, Help! My Company Has Just Been Taken Over, Fortune,
July 9, 1984, at 45; Takeover Tactics and Public Policy, Hearings before the Subcommittee
of Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance of the Committee on Energy
and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (testimony
of various witnesses); Impact of Mergers, supra note 12, at 14-56 (Statements of various
witnesses); Schmitt, Depleted Field: Despite Raiders' Lust, Oil Industry is Facing Re-
trenchment Period, Wall St. J., June 7, 1985 at 1; Baxter Plans Layoffs; Merger is
Completed, NY. Times, Nov. 26, 1985 at D4, col. 3; Buzzotta, A Quiet Crisis in the
Work Place, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1985 at A27, col. 2; Prokesch, "People Trauma" in
Mergers, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1985 at DI, col. 3; Smith, Sweeping Staff Cuts at CBS
News, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1985 at C30, col. 4.
181. Corporate Takeovers, supra note 9, at 50-51.
182. Brown and Medoff, The Impact of Firm Acquisitions on Labor, in A. Auerbach,
supra note 16, at 23. This study was limited to small firms, however, and did not
differentiate between friendly and hostile mergers. Id. See also Macey, State Anti-Takeover
Legislation and the National Economy, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 467, 478.
183. Three other studies have found level or moderate declines in unemployment after
LBO's and one study found steep declines in unemployment. Long and Ravenscraft, the
Record of LBO Performance (July 11 1989), in Corporate Restructuring, supra note 183,
at 58, 60 [hereinafter Record of LBO Performance]. A study by KKR, nevertheless, found
that LBO's actually created 37,000 new jobs, Presentation on Leveraged Buy-Outs by
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on employment between management approved and unsolicited outside
mergers bids.'1
Another area of concern relating to employees is the target's pension
plans that provide for the worker's retirement. According to the Pension
Benefit Guarantee Corporation about 1,200 pension plans with excess
assets of at least $1 million each were either terminated or pending
termination between January 1980 and June 1986.185 A study of these
plans from 1980-1987, however, found that out of 327 terminations of
overfunded pension plans by companies listed in the New York or
American exchanges, only five were terminated within a year of an
actual or attempted hostile takeover.'1
6
b. Effect on the Community
Horror stories abound regarding the terrible effects a takeover will
have on suppliers, a community's tax base, and corporate charitable
giving.1 97 But again, the evidence that takeovers hurt communities is
only antidotal, and some evidence even indicates that takeovers do not
hurt the community."88 Furthermore, many of the stories regarding the
effects of takeovers on communities usually involve takeovers or takeover
defenses in which there are massive increases in the corporation's lev-
Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co. (Jan. 1989), in Corporate Restructuring and R&D,
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Science, Research and Technology of the Committee
on Science, Space and Technology, U.S. House of Rep., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (Doc.
No. 101-36) at 148, 162 [hereinafter Corporate Restructuring]. This study, however, has
been criticized. See Ricks, Two Scholars Blast KKR Buy-Out Study that Reached Pro-
Takeover Conclusion, Wall St. J., May 10, 1989 at A2, A8.
184. See infra note 208.
185. Leverage Buyouts and the Pot of Gold: Trends, Public Policy, and Case Studies,
A Report for the Use of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the
Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
at 41 (1987). These plans covered more than 1.4 million participants and had about $14
billion in excess assets. Id.
186. Study Finds Pension Plan Terminations often not Caused Directly by Takeovers,
21 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. 1826 (BNA) (1989). 17 terminations were the result of leveraged
buyouts, however. Id.
187. For example when Gulf Oil was acquired by Chevron community leaders were
concerned because Gulf gave 3% of the contributions to the local United Way and an
additional $2 million to fifty other charities. Furthermore, Allegeheny County faced the
loss of $2 million in personal and corporate property taxes. See Romano, supra note 78,
at 121.
188. Magnet, What Merger Mania Did to Syracuse, Fortune, Feb. 3, 1986 at 94. See,
e.g., Magnet, Help! My Company Has Just Been Taken Over, Fortune, July 9, 1986 at
45; testimony of various witnesses in Takeover Tactics and Public Policy, Hearings before
the Subcommittee of Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance of the Com-
mittee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1985).
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erage, not an actual change of control. For example, the most common
story regarding the effects of takeovers on communities is regarding
Bartlesville, Oklahoma, the'headquarters of Phillips Petroleum. Phillips,
in an effort to stave off a hostile takeover, initiated a massive restruc-
turing in which the corporation borrowed $5 billion and returned it to
the shareholders in a stock buyback.18 9 The alleged economic dislocations
were not the result of a change of control; there was none. There is
simply no evidence that takeovers systematically have a negative impact
on communities.
4. Corporate Efficiency
The final justification offered to support anti-takeover statutes is
the protection of corporate efficiency. According to detractors of tak-
eovers and mergers, takeovers force companies to cut research and
development (R&D), adopt short term perspectives, and generally run
inefficiently. 90 No evidence supports this thesis. Companies that are
taken over are usually less efficient and have lower than average capital
expenditures than other companies in their field. Companies that are
taken over are usually in businesses that are not research intensive, such
as retailing, and there is evidence that research and development ex-
penditures decrease in a change of control. Some evidence, however,
shows that takeovers create more efficient corporations and create more
growth.
a. Effect of Takeovers on Corporations
No evidence indicates takeovers decrease the economic performance
of targets. On the contrary, the evidence supports that takeover targets
are usually not using their assets efficiently, and that takeovers increase
their efficiency. Corporations that are targets of hostile offers usually
are operated at below industry norms in all respects. Targets of hostile
takeovers had below industry income-to-asset ratios.' 9' The ratio of the
189. Impact of Mergers, supra note 12 (Testimony of Paul M. Hirsch, Professor of
Business Policy, University of Chicago Graduate School of Business). See also, Bartlesville
Is Wary, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1985, at 20; Potts, Phillips Offers a Blueprint for Industry
Change, Wash. Post, Mar. 17, 1985, at DI, col. 1; Scott, How Citizens and Businesses
Rally Round When Takeovers Threat Strides into Town, Christian Sci. Mon., Apr. 22,
1985, at 13-14.
190. See, e.g., Orr, supra note 148, at 30. The Governor of Indiana advocated
antitakeover statutes because they provided more profitable utilization of assets and better
long term corporate growth.
191. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, Characteristics of Targets of Hostile and Friendly
Takeovers [hereinafter Characteristics of Targets], in A. Auerbach, supra note 16, at 118,
Table 4.3a. Record of LBO Performance, supra note 183, at 41. Corporations that were
targets of friendly mergers, on the other hand, were on average operating at twice the
respective industry norm for income-to-asset ratios. Id.
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target's market value to the replacement value of its tangible assets also
was markedly lower. 92 Hostile targets in addition had lower R&D ex-
penditures than the industry standard" and also tended to have lower
capital expenditures per share.' 94 Furthermore, evidence based on a va-
riety of economic indices shows takeover targets tend to be characterized
by a history of declining performance relative to firms in the same
industry. 95 Finally, there is evidence that once firms do change owners
they have higher productivity ratios than firms that did not change
control. '9
b. Research and Development
One of the primary criticisms of hostile takeovers and related trans-
actions is that they force management to adopt a short term focus.197
There is no evidence of this, although takeovers in some instances could
cause management to concentrate too much on the financial rather than
production aspects of running their business. 9 Furthermore, there is
evidence that shareholders see through plans designed to increase short-
term earnings, at the expense of long-term profits and expansion, and
do not offer increased prices for firms that adopt short-sighted business
policies.'" In addition, studies have found that the stock market, and
192. The ratio of market value to replacement value of assets in the sample, all Fortune
500 companies, was 8.48; for targets of friendly mergers, 7.96, and targets of hostile
mergers it was only 5.24.
193. See Restricting Takeovers, supra note 64, at 64. See infra text accompanying
notes 202-05. Firms that are usually targets of LBO's and hostile takeovers are usually
in industries with low R&D expenditures anyway.
194. Restricting Takeovers, supra note 64, at 64.
195. Id. at 64-65.
196. One study of 18,000 relatively large plants throughout the manufacturing sector
in the United states found that about 19% of these plants changed owners at least once
during a nine year period, and of the plants that changed, most changed ownership more
than once. The study found that the least productive plants are most likely to be acquired,
on average 2.80o less productive, and that plants that did change owners had higher
productivity. Lictenberg, Productivity Improvements from Changes in Ownership, 23 Mer-
gers and Acquisitions 48, 50 (1988). Nevertheless, one study found that the hostilely
acquired corporation usually failed to increase in performance after the acquisition. Record
of LBO Performance, supra note 183, at 43. But this study neglected to include the value
created by the money that was distributed to shareholders when the company was taken
over. Takeover Dangers, supra note 15, at 308 (citing Economic Report of the President
(1985) at 201).
197. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 4, at 89-90.
198. See id.; Weiss, Comment-Mergers and Takeovers: Taxes, Capital Structure, and
the Incentives of Managers, in Coffee, supra note 9, at 363.
199. See Curran, Companies that Rob the Future, Fortune, July 4, 1988, at 84; Jarrell,
Brickley, and Netter, The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since
1980, 2 J. Econ. Persp. 49, 55 (Winter 1988).
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hence the shareholders, normally appreciate long term investments, such
as R&D, and stocks on average jump one percent in value with each
R&D announcement. 200
Most studies indicate that R&D has not been affected by takeovers
and related restructuring. 20' This is probably because most corporations
that are considered ideal targets have low R&D budgets. 20 2 A large study
by the University of California at Berkeley found no evidence of reduced
R&D spending at the 320 firms involved in deals out of a total sample
of 2,500 firms that were tracked between 1976 and 1985.203 This same
result was reached in a similar study of acquisitions in 1986 and 1987.204
In addition, a study by the Office of Technology Assessment found
firms that had been subject to a takeover or related restructuring did
not reduce corporate R&D because of a change in control. 205
C. The Political Truth
Despite public and legislative misconceptions about corporate mergers
and acquisitions, the legislatures do have logical reasons for passing
200. The Battle for Corporate Control, Bus. Wk., May 18, 1987, at 102, 105 [here-
inafter Battle for Corporate Control]. Jarrell and Lehn, Takeover Threats Don't Crimp
Long-Term Planning, Wall St. J., May 1, 1985, at 32, col. 3.
201. Corporate Restructuring, supra note 183, at 85-86 (Testimony of Dr. Frank R.
Lichtenberg, Columbia University Graduate School of Business and a Research Associate
at the National Bureau of Economic Research). See also, Hall, Effects of Takeover
Activity on Corporate Research and Development, in A. Auerbach, supra note 16, at 92.
Of course there are individual examples of R&D being cut after a change of control or
related restructuring, but these are only after the incursion of a large amount of debt.
For example, Polaroid Corporation after restructuring to defeat a takeover, reduced R&D
from 8.5% of sales to 7.5% of sales and laid off 400 employees from their R&D
department. Corporate Restructuring, supra note 183, at 14 (Statement of Dr. Julie Gorte,
Senior Analyst, OTA).
202. See Battle for Corporate Control, supra note 200, at 102, 105; Cook, What the
Economics Literature Has to Say About Takeovers, in Chilton, supra note 15, at 8. The
same is true for firms susceptible to LBO's. See Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co.,
Leveraged Buy-Outs (Jan. 1989), in Corporate Restructuring, supra note 183, at 166.
203. Corporate Restructuring, supra note 183, at 45 (Statement of Bronwyn Hall,
Assistant Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley). One study com-
missioned by the National Science Foundation (NSF) of 200 firms, of which 16 firms
had been involved in mergers, found that R&D dropped an average of 5.3%; Corporate
Restructuring, supra note 183, at 25 (Testimony of Mr. William L. Stewart, Director,
Division of Science Resources Studies, National Science Foundation). Mr. Stewart found
that when adjusted for inflation R&D did not grow in 1985, 1986 or 1987. Id. at 24.
This survey, however, has been subject to serious criticism because of its sample and
methodology. Some academics believe the sample of 16 firms that were actually subject
to takeovers was too small to be statistically significant. Furthermore, the study was based
on secret U.S. census data which cannot be revealed.
204. Corporate Restructuring, supra note 183, at 44.
205. Corporate Restructuring, supra note 183, at 7 (Testimony of Julie Gorte, Senior
Analyst, Office of Technology Assessment).
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anti-takeover legislation. First, takeovers may instigate local economic
dislocations that directly affect a respective state official's constituents.2 06
Second, any harm from an anti-takeover statute is dispersed to share-
holders and the national economy while protecting domestic constitu-
ents .207
Corporate mergers can dislocate workers, suppliers, and of course
corporate management. 20 The management, the workers, and the sup-
pliers are located in the state, and are of concern to the state elected
officials. 209 However, shareholders are dispersed all over the country,
and many, if not all, are not constituents and have little influence on
state elected officials. 210
The state anti-takeover laws are in part passed because of this
political externality "in which state legislatures are able to provide
benefits to local interests by imposing costs on politically disorganized
individuals who do not reside within the state."' 21' The irony is that the
statutes still allow takeovers if approved by management and there is
no evidence that changes in control approved by management result in
fewer dislocations than hostile takeovers.2 1 1
VI. JOINING OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN MANAGEMENT
A. Controlling Corporate Management
The market for corporate control is the only serious mechanism for
limiting management opportunism, 213 and management through the state
anti-takeover legislation has effectively stripped it from the shareholders
206. See Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment
of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1145, 1248
(1984); Takeover Dangers, supra note 15, at 304-05.
207. Impact of Mergers, supra note 12, at 22 (Testimony of Geoffrey Miller, Associate
Dean and Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School).
208. However, there is no evidence that acquisitions result in greater job loss, except
at the highest levels. Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra note 101, at 497 (citing Brown
& Medoff, The Impact of Firm Acquisitions on Labor, Corporate Takeovers: Causes and
Consequences 9 (A. Auerbach ed. 1988). See also Bamonte, supra note 109, at 262.
209. Butler, supra note 103, at 366.
210. Bamonte, supra note 109, at 262.
211. Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation and the National Economy, 1988 Wis.
L. Rev. 467, 471.
212. Bamonte, supra note 109, at 263.
213. Gilson, supra note 79, at 841.
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without their consent. Not only are shareholders hurt by these proposals,
but our entire economy is affected.
Other mechanisms to control management such as limited charter
executive authority, incentive compensation, legislative amendment of
corporate charters and judicial review of management actions, have
failed. 2 4 Corporate charter limitations limit the corporation's flexibility
and have not been effectively enforced by the courts. 25 Incentive com-
pensation plans have also not worked. 21 6 The boards of directors have
been unable to establish management benefits that are related to cor-
porate performance, risk, and size of the corporation. 21 7
The third method of controlling management, legislative amendments
of the corporate charter, has been used very effectively by management
in anti-takeover statutes. Unfortunately, the dispersed shareholders are
unable to exercise effective political influence and the state legislatures
have been dominated by management. The final method, judicial review
of management acts, is also completely ineffective, as is evidenced in
recent Delaware case law. 218 The relaxed interpretation of fiduciary duties
through the business judgement rule coupled with state anti-takeover
laws has allowed management broad discretion to run their corporation,
even for their own benefit. 2 9 Broad fiduciary duties as a means of
control are also very expensive because of the litigation, inefficiency,
and uncertainty of expenses that arise out of ex post judicial determi-
nations of management conduct. 2 0
214. Carney, Controlling Management Opportunism in the Market for Corporate Con-
trol: An Agency Cost Model, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 385, 387.
215. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Moran
v. Household Int., Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Ribstein, supra note 4, at 103.
216. Coffee, No Exit?: Opting Out, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and
the Special Case of Remedies, 53 Brooklyn L. Rev. 919, 943-44 (1988).
217. See infra text accompanying notes 236-40 and 304. Management's domination of
boards of directors also prevent the board from effectively monitoring management com-
pensation. Absent a substantial equity interest in the firm, the manager through his salary
is an implicit debt holder, looking to a future stream of salary payments and thus has
an incentive to reduce his firm's stock volatility through inefficient behavior to make it
less risky. Shareholders versus Managers, infra note 268, at 26 (citing Note, The Executive
Compensation Contract: Creating Incentives to Reduce Agency Costs, 37 Stan. L. Rev.
1147, 1174 (1985)).
218. See supra note 215; Comment, The Misapplication of the Business Judgement
Rule in Contests for Corporate Control, 76 N.W. U.L. Rev. 980 (1982); Carney, supra
note 214, at 392-402; Davis, supra note 102, at 512; Takeover Controversy, supra note
160, at 342.
219. Steinberg, supra note 1, at 38.
220. Ribstein, supra note 4, at 111-19; Gilson, supra note 79, at 834-35; see Takeover
Controversy, supra note 160, at 346-47. Courts lack the experience and information to
make business decisions, and plaintiffs also lack the requisite information to know whether
they have a good suit or not. See Easterbrook and Fischell, supra note 10, at 1195-96.
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Without effective mechanisms for the monitoring and removal of
management through tender offers, management is free to increase cor-
porate waste through inefficency and the appropriation of corporate
profits. The American corporate system has divorced management's
interest from shareholders so that shareholders have not only lost control
of their corporations, but they have lost their right to participate in the
fruits of ownership.22" '
Management has appropriated the fruits of ownership both through
incredible compensation packages and perks and through satisficing222
behavior in which management chooses low risk investments or refuses
to adapt to changing market conditions, so that there is little risk of
management either losing their job or having to work too hard. 223 These
agency problems and the likelihood management will try to transfer
wealth from shareholders to themselves decrease when management has
an ownership position in the firm. 224
B. The Effect of Hostile Takeovers On Management
Shareholders, because they are dispersed and own too little stock,
cannot usually justify active involvement in corporate governance. 22 Key
to most corporate theorists was that the market for the control of the
corporation would keep management efficient and honest even if share-
holders no longer were able to directly participate in the corporation
and control management.2 26 The increase in management compensation,
221. It is almost universally recognized that management is not reliably inclined to
unremitting profit maximization. "[Mlanagers like other economic agents, pursue their
own interest when and as the opportunities permit." Williamson, Comment: Shareholders
and Managers-A Risk Neutral Perspective, in Coffee, supra note 9, at 160.
222. Satisficing refers to the theory that managers do not profit maximize, but only
seek the level of profits that will prevent external interventions by dissatisfied creditors
or stockholders. See H. Simon, Models of Man: Social and Rational (1957); R. Gordon,
Business Leadership in the Large Corporation (1961). The higher the barriers to outside
intervention, the more the manager can lower his goals.
223. Management tends to want to retain earnings and invest in a broad spectrum of
activities to in effect create a balanced portfolio of risk within the firm itself. Growth
at the expense of profitability provides management with greater compensation, greater
psychic income and greater security. See Shareholders Versus Managers, infra note 268,
at 29-31. Management often refuses or cannot respond to changing market conditions.
Takeover Controversy, supra note 160, at 318-19.
224. See Takeover Controversy, supra note 160, at 344. For example, management in
firms that adopt poison pills, on the average, own less than half of the normal percentage
of equity, 16.5% to 7.5%. Id.
225. Gilson, supra note 79, at 834-35; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 10, at 1169-
74; Ribstein, supra note 4, at 80.
226. Manne, Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1427, 1431
(1964); Frech, Are Managers an Elite Clique with Dictatorial Power,? The Attack on
Corporate America 78-79 (M. Johnson ed.) (1978) [hereinafter Attack on Corporate
America]; Ribstein, supra note 4, at 80.
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at the same time that shareholder compensation through regular distri-
butions has decreased, strongly suggests that the neoclassists were correct
in predicting that management's power was increasing at the same time
the shareholder's power was decreasing. 227 Takeovers were the one factor
that would keep management efficiently fulfilling its management roles.
The threat of a possible takeover puts pressure on management to
use the firm's assets more economically. 22 This is critical to understand-
ing the effect of state corporate anti-takeover statutes. Any impediment
in the market for corporate control reduces any remaining shareholder
control and allows management to act inefficiently without fear of being
replaced.2 29
Most corporate anti-takeover statutes do not eliminate the market
for corporate control completely. State anti-takeover statutes do, how-
ever, increase the transaction cost of a takeover transaction.23 0 As long
as incumbent management does not waste more than the premium re-
quired by the state anti-takeover statute, management is free to continue
wasting the firm's assets. 21 "This lost premium reflects a foregone social
gain from the superior employment of the firms's assets. '"232
Corporate anti-takeover statutes force outside bidders to either get
management's consent, usually through liberal compensation packages
and employment guarantees to management, or to bid such a high
amount that management can no longer refuse the bid without worrying
that they may have violated a fiduciary duty. 233 In effect, anti-takeover
statutes restrict the market for corporate control. The restricted market
allows management greater discretion to self-deal and act inefficiently.
Management, without the monitoring effect of takeovers, can take more
than promised by either taking more of the corporation's income stream
227. See, e.g., A. Berle & G. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property
120-21 (1932).
228. Easterbrook and Fischell, supra note 10, at 1171-74. See also Hackl, supra note
10, at 1198-99.
229. See Manne, supra note 226, at 1430-31; Ribstein, supra note 4, at 109.
230. See, e.g., Newlin and Gilmer, The Pennsylvania Shareholder Protection Act: A
New State Approach to Deflecting Corporate Takeover Bids, 40 Bus. Law. 111, 121
(1984):
The requirement of a super majority to accomplish certain changes in the
corporation ... will raise the offeror's cost of acquiring control, will make
takeover difficult or impossible when management controls enough stock to
block the vote even if the an offeror buys out all other shareholders, and may
enable management to arrange a friendly acquisition.
Id. For more detailed analysis, see supra text accompanying notes 87-100.
231. See Hackl, supra note 10, at 1197-99.
232. Easterbrook and Fischell, supra note 10, at 1175.
233. It has been recognized that fiduciary duties are not effective in monitoring manager
performance. See supra notes 218-220.
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than economically necessary or by satisficing and other types of une-
conomical risk-averse behavior.2
3 4
C. Executive Compensation
Anti-takeover statutes are passed to protect the group that needs
the least economic protection, management. Management compensation
is at an all time high-120 times what the average American earns.23
In 1988, the average chief executive officer's (CEO) salary was $1.14
million and the average total compensation jumped to more than $2
million, an average increase of seventeen percent. 23 6 That increase was
three times the 5.1% gain by middle managers and professional em-
ployees. The average CEO compensation in 1988 was ten times what it
was in 1960 and rose approximately twice as fast as the average American
professional's salary. 23 7
American CEO compensation also does not correspond with what
foreign corporations pay their CEO's. 2 s In fact, American executive
compensation does not appear to be market-based. A leading executive
compensation analyst found that rational economic factors, such as the
size of the corporation, performance, the risk of the company, and
industry, only accounted for thirty-nine percent of the variation in
234. See Comment, The 1983 Amendments to Pennsylvania's Business Corporation
Law: Unconstitutional? MITE Be, 89 Dick. L. Rev. 401, 435 (1985); Winter, supra note
121, at 287-88; Gilson, supra note 79, at 837; Easterbrook and Fischell, supra note 10,
at 1170.
235. Average CEO compensation, see infra note 236, compared with the average weekly
gross non-agricultural earnings. Economic Indicators, supra note 168, at 15 (the average
annual salary was $16,763).
236. Byrne, Grover, and Vogel, Is the Boss Getting Paid Too Much?, Bus. Wk., May
1, 1989, at 46, 47-48. The increase in 1987 was 8%. Id. at 46.
237. Id. In 1960 the average executive compensation was $191,383. This was 41 times
the average pay of a factory worker, 38 times the pay of a average school teacher, and
19 times the pay of an average engineer. In 1988, the average CEO's compensation was
93 times the average factory worker's, 72 times an average teacher's salary, and 44 times
an engineer's salary. Id. at 48.
238. See Tully, American Bosses are Over Paid, Fortune, Nov. 7, 1988 at 123, 124-
26. For example, only about an estimated 30 chief executives in all of Europe made $1
million in 1987. Some comparisons for approximately same product groups: General
Electric: CEO salary $12.631 million, sales $39.3 billion, profits $2.9 billion; Siemens (W.
Germ.): CEO salary $.930 million, sales $27.5 billion, profits $649.6 million; Electrolux
(Sweden): CEO salary $.437 million, sales $10.6 billion, profits, $288.8 million; JVC
(Japan): CEO salary $.290 million, sales $5.5 billion, profits $50.7 million; Chrysler: CEO
salary $17.656 million, sales $26.3 billion, profits $1.3 billion; Daimler-Benz (W. Germany):
CEO salary $1.2 million, sales $37.5 billion, profits $970.2 million; Peugeot (France):
CEO salary, $250,000 sales, $19.7 billion, profits $1.1 billion; Honda (Japan): CEO salary
$450,000, sales $17.2 billion, profits $516.2 million. Id.
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executive pay in both 1987 and 1988.239 Absolutely no correlation existed
between any change in performance and salary.m
Not only do corporate executives receive huge compensation packages
for working, but they also receive mandatory severance pay, called
"golden parachutes" if the company is taken over or merged.Y4 Golden
parachute payments can be tremendous. For example, F. Ross Johnson,
the former CEO of RJR Nabisco, received $54 million after his company
was taken over by a partnership led by KKR.U 2 Golden parachutes even
239. Crystal, Seeking the Sense in CEO Pay, Fortune, June 5, 1989, at 88. Mr. Crystal
believes that CEO compensation has gotten so out of line with company performance
because corporate boards of directors always want to pay higher than the "average"
executive compensation. The boards usually hire a "compensation consultant" who gives
the board the average executive salary. The board then votes to pay a salary higher than
average which, of course, raises the average, forcing the next board to pay an even higher
salary. Id.
240. Some boards have even reduced the bonus incentive targets after poor corporate
performance to ensure that top management still received their bonus. See id. at 104;
Byrne and Vogel, supra note 236, at 51.
241. Traditionally golden parachute payments were only effective if the corporation
was taken over in a hostile takeover. Now, these parachute payments are even payable
in friendly mergers in which the executive negotiated the merger himself. For example,
Gerald Tsai, the former chairman of Primerica Corp., along with nine other executives
received $98.2 million in golden parachute payments. Primerica was taken over in a
friendly merger. The golden parachutes originally were only effective after a hostile merger,
but 3 months after the merger was agreed to the board modified the parachute agreement
to pay after friendly mergers. The "outside compensation committee" contained some
members who received up to $5.2 million in legal fees from the corporation. Byrne, supra
note 236, at 49-50.
242. Id. at 49-50 (It is interesting to note that Mr. Johnson started the takeover war
for RJR Nabisco with his own bid for the company.) See also Johnson & Morris, Beatrice
Cos. Grants Golden Parachutes Totaling $23.5 Million to Six Officials, Wall St. J., Nov.
25, 1985, at 4, col. 1; Allied-Signal Ties Proves Lucrative to Executives, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 13, 1985, at D2, col. 5.
This is not to say that golden parachutes are not useful. Executives invest substantial
amounts of their "human capital" in their firm, and much of their economic return
depends on deferred compensation. Golden parachutes can help protect the executive and
allow her to worry less about job security. See Coffee, Shareholders versus Managers:
The Strain in the Corporate Web, in Coffee, supra note 9, at 73-77 [hereinafter Share-
holders versus Managers]; Takeover Controversy, supra note 160, at 340. Some other top
golden parachutes:
TOP GOLDEN PARACHUTES
Name Firm Amount
(In thousands)
F. Ross Johnson, CEO RJR Nabisco $53,800
E. A. Horrigan, V. Ch. RJR Nabisco 45,700
Gerald Tsai, Jr., Ch. Primerica 46,800
Michael C. Bergerac Revlon 35,000
Edward P. Evans, Ch. Macmillan 31,900
Kenneth A. Yarnell, Pres. Primerica 18,400
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have been amended to give management the parachute payment after a
friendly offer is consummated. 243
In addition to large salaries and golden parachute payments, ex-
ecutives today also are making large sums of money taking their com-
panies private through LBO's. Management has taken full advantage of
the loophole in most state anti-takeover laws that allows managers to
bid for their own companies without meeting the requirements of the
applicable anti-takeover statutes. Through the institution of the man-
agement LBO, management is realizing even more of their corporations'
earnings. In the Metromedia LBO, for instance, Metromedia's assets
increased in value four hundred and ninety percent from $1.6 billion
at the time of the buyout in mid-1984 to $6.5 billion in early 1987. 2
The CEO, John Kluge, made over $3 billion in two years, and man-
agement overall received $4.65 billion?25 In the process of the leveraged
buyout his official ownership increased from twenty-five percent to
ninety-three percent.24 The Metromedia case is not an isolated episode.2 7
John D. Martin, Ex. VP RJR Nabisco 18,200
Sanford C. Sigoloff, Ch. Wickes 15,900
Whitney Stevens, Ch. J. P. Stevens 15,700
Philip L. Smith, Ch. Pillsbury 11,000
Wilhelm A. Mallory, Sr. VP Wickes 7,500
Byrne, supra note 236, at 47.
243. See supra note 241.
244. There is evidence that Metromedia management purposefully used improper ac-
counting measures to artificially devalue the company. The value of the assets of Me-
tromedia increased in value 490% from $1.6 billion to $6.5 billion at the time of the
sale. Id. In the Metromedia LBO the stock was at a six year low allegedly because of
poor management accounting practices which some believe was intentional. Id. See also
Stein, Shooting Fish in A Barrel: Why Management Always Makes a Bundle in a LBO,
Barrons, Jan. 12, 1987, at 6.
245. Hector, Are Shareholders Cheated by LBO's, Fortune, Jan. 10, 1987, at 98, 100.
246. Id. at 100.
247. Donald Kelly, the CEO of Beatrice Foods made $400 million from the LBO of
his company in 1986. Id. at 98, 104. Another example, Fred Meyer is a regional discount
store that was publicly held in 1981, but closely controlled by the Fred Meyer family.
Management in combination with KKR proposed to take the company private. Management
was aware of the huge value of the real estate that was carried on Fred Meyer's books
at cost. This unrealized difference was $110 to $140 million. The value of this property
was never disclosed to shareholders. An "outside" committee of three outside directors
met six hours to discuss management's bid, and did not solicit any other bids or even
consider a French bid at $2 a share higher than the management bid. No independent
appraisal was taken, and the investment bankers and lawyers that the management normally
used were hired to write the fairness opinions. Management bid $55 a share for a total
of $420 million. The actual value was estimated to be at least $70 a share, and the
company was sold in 1987 for $900 million or over $100 a share. Id. at 100, 104.
Or consider the firm SFN, a publisher and media corporation. The management led
takeover was opposed by three of the board of directors and an independent appraisal
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D. Retained Earnings
The source for this unrealized value retained by management is the
corporation's retained earnings'" and under or mis-utilized assets and
information. A recent study found a strong relationship between the
decision to go private and retained earnings in the years 1984 through
1987.249 The higher the retained earnings, the more likely management
would realize these undistributed earnings through a management LBO. 250
The satisficing behavior of management in not adopting riskier, higher
return investments is evident in another study that found firms in which
management did not have a significant ownership interest had a rate of
return fifty percent lower than firms where ownership and control was
united. 25'
Management has traditionally justified retaining earnings and not
distributing them to shareholders on two bases: federal tax laws and
the corporation's high internal rate of return. The two main tax reasons
for not distributing earnings to shareholders customarily have been the
lower capital gains rate applied when value is realized through the sale
of stock rather than by dividends and the lower corporate taxation
was obtained that found management's bid to be too low. The investment bank further
recommended that an auction be held for the firm and several bids solicited. In addition
several large corporations contacted SFN interested in making a bid for the company.
Nevertheless, the management-controlled board refused to consider other bids and approved
the sell-out. (Evidently the terms were so good that one of the interested suitors joined
the LBO partnership.) The management LBO then sold the company one year later for
twice what they paid for it. Id.
Other "reverse" LBO's include: Blue Bell, Dr. Pepper, Leslie Fay, Lily Tulip, and
Uniroyal. The value of these companies' assets increased from between 55% and 1031%
after being brought public. Id.
248. Retained earnings are the net profits which have not been paid out as dividends.
Black's Law Dictionary 1183 (5th Ed. 1979).
249. Lehn and Poulsen, Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in Going Private
Transactions, 44 J. Fin. 771, 772 (July 1989). The use of going private transactions
eliminates any gains that could be attributed to synergy or a better management team.
A going private transaction is where the public shareholders are bought out and the bidder
takes a concentrated ownership in the new privately held firm. Id. at 771.
250. Id. at 772.
251. Shareholders versus Managers, supra note 242, at 84, 121 n.37 (citing W. McEachern,
Managerial Control and Performance 39-51 (1975)). See also Ferenbach, The Birth of the
Financial Entrepreneur, Wall St. J., March 4, 1987, at 30, Col. 4 (A partner in a leveraged
buyout firm unconsciously recognized this new division of ownership, "In my experience,
most leverage buyouts are not about financial risk, junk bonds, or unwanted takeovers-
although one or all of these elements may be present. Instead, they are about ownership,
which translates into dedication, commitment, focus and eventually a better company.")
Id.
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rate.252 Both these reasons were eliminated by the 1986 tax reform.2 11
The other reason management retained earnings rather than distrib-
uted them was that they could increase the shareholders rate of return.254
The corporation could invest the retained earnings providing a lower
cost of capital to the corporation and give the shareholder an effective
return on the earnings. A recent study, however, found that corporate
performance and the return to shareholders by the means of capital
appreciation and dividends were completely unrelated. 2"1
The study conducted of the fifty largest United States corporations
from 1970-1984 found that over half of the corporations in the sample
actually lost money for shareholders through retained earnings and poor
investments. This means that the shareholders received less than the
company earned by either dividends or capital appreciation over any
five year period. 2 6 Companies in the bottom of the survey actually lost
more money for the shareholder than the company earned. 257 The share-
holders simply did not gain from the retained earnings and could have
actually made more money by taking the earnings and depositing them
in the bank.258 An average of sixteen percent of the retained earnings
simply disappeared; they were neither realized in dividends nor capital
appreciation. 25
9
The above evidence regarding management compensation and re-
tained earnings supports Michael Jensen's thesis that the source of
premiums in takeovers is the corporation's excess cash flow that is either
absorbed in management's salaries or unproductive investments. 26° The
premium turned over to shareholders is not at the expense of employees
252. See Bryan, Leveraged Buyouts and Tax Policy, 65 N.C.L. Rev. 1039, 1070 (1987).
253. Id. Other tax reasons remain. For example, by retaining earnings the corporation
allows the individual shareholder to control when he will realize income by selling the
stock when he wants rather than earning regular dividends. Id. at 1073.
254. Ball, The Mysterious Disappearance of Retained Earnings, Harv. Bus. Rev. July-
August 1987, at 57. This by no means is a novel idea. A recent Wall Street Journal
article dramatically illustrates this point. The article discussed what several companies were
going to do with large cash surpluses. At no point in the article did one of the corporation's
managers suggest returning the surplus to shareholders. Smith, Money Talks Loudest in
Takeovers Now, Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1990, at Cl. Some of the corporations and the
amount of cash: Ford, $5.7 billion, CBS, $3 billion, Paramount, $2.5 billion, General
Cinema, $1.1 billion, Walt Disney, $1.05 billion.
255. Ball, supra note 254, at 60.
256. Id. at 57-58.
257. Id. at 58. For example shareholders of Xerox actually lost $1.19 for every $1.00
in Xerox's earnings. Likewise the shareholders of Coca-Cola only received 12% of Coca-
Cola's earnings.
258. Id. at 60.
259. Id. at 58.
260. Jensen, Agency and Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers,
76 Am. Econ. Rev. 323, 324 (1986); Takeover Controversy, supra note 160, at 321-22.
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or the corporation's economic performance. If management does not
use the corporation's cash surplus efficiently by either returning the
firm's profits to the shareholders or investing the earnings in an eco-
nomically competitive investment once management's waste exceeds the
transaction cost of a takeover, the firm would be taken over in a free
market and the surplus given to shareholders. 261 Payment of the firm's
earnings to shareholders reduces the resources under management's con-
trol, limiting management's discretionary authority over free cash flow.
262
Furthermore, because there is less retained earnings, management is
forced to rely on the capital markets, increasing the monitoring of the
firm.26 3 What the threat of takeover accomplishes is the alignment of
the shareholder's and management's interests. 2"
VII. LEVERAGE AND SOCIETY'S CONCERNS
A. The Importance of Leverage
Many of the states' policy concerns expressed in passing anti-takeover
statutes could be addressed by monitoring or limiting leverage. Leverage
is simply the term used to describe when debt is used to finance a
corporation. The higher the amount of debt in the corporation, the
more leveraged the corporation.
265
1. Leverage In Our Economy Today
The amount of leverage in the corporate, as well as the public
2
"
and other private sectors, 267 is at an all time high. Corporate debt, not
including financial institutions, is also at record levels and stood at $1.8
trillion in 1988, double the level that existed just six years earlier in
1982.26s In the stock markets, over $96 billion worth of equity was
261. Manne, supra note 226, at 1430-31.
262. Takeover Controversy, supra note 160, at 321-22.
263. Id.
264. Hackl, supra note 10, at 1198-99.
265. Van Home, Financial Management and Policy 249-50 (6th ed. 1983).
266. The gross federal debt in 1989 was $2,866 billion. Economic Indicators, supra
note 168, at 32.
267. The average American paid in 1988 900o of his earnings, after essentials to debt
service. In 1975 this figure was only 65%. Going for the Broke, Newsweek, Apr. 2, 1990,
at 40.
268. Farrell, Learning to Live with Leverage, Bus. Wk., Nov. 7, 1988, at 138. Much
of this leverage was incurred to either purchase corporations or used as an anticipatory
defense. See Shareholders versus Managers, supra note 242, at 41-44.
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withdrawn in 1988,26 and a total of $444 billion in equity has been
extinguished between 1983 and the first half of 1989.270 Total debt in
the American economy rose two hundred and fifty percent from 1977
to 1984.271
Corporate debt of non-financial companies expanded at a rate of
85.4% in comparison to the United States gross national product (GNP),
which from 1976 to 1982 grew by 77.6%.272 From 1982 to 1987, the
corporate debt climbed 73.9% and the GNP grew 41.7%; the gap
between GNP and corporate debt growth expanded from eight to thirty-
two percentage points.273 This amount of leverage has become so great
that corporate non-operating expenses, four-fifths of which are interest
expenses from borrowing, rose from eighteen percent in 1976 to over
fifty percent of corporate expenditures in 1988.274
2. The Effects of Leverage
Traditional financial theorists believe that leverage increases the re-
turn available to the owners of the corporation, but also increases the
risk and magnitude of the loss. 25 This effect is magnified by the double
taxation of dividends, which makes debt-financing less expensive than
equity financing, and consequently gives a higher return to a more highly
leveraged corporation. 276
Leverage can also aid corporate governance by performing valuable
signaling and bonding functions. Leverage can be viewed as a method
269. Slater, Stock Market Faced Massive Exodus in '88, Wall St. J., Dec. 29, 1988,
at Cl, col. 1. In 1983 $60 billion in debt was issued and $28 billion in new equity was
issued. In 1984 $196 billion in debt was issued and $75 billion in equity withdrawn. In
1985 $167 billion in new debt was issued and $84 billion in equity withdrawn. In 1986
$190 billion in debt was issued and $81 billion in equity withdrawn. In 1987 $154 billion
in debt was issued and 77 billion in equity was withdrawn, and in 1988 $207 billion was
issued and a total of $140 billion in equity was withdrawn. Farrell, supra note 268, at
138-43 (citing Federal Reserve Board Figures).
270. Koretz, Economic Trends, The Acquisition Boom Has Lost a Lot of its Thunder,
Bus. Wk., June 12, 1989, at 18.
271. Weidenbaum, supra note 25, at 69.
272. Carey, The Corporate Walking Wounded, Fin. World, Apr. 19, 1988, at 24.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Durand, Costs of Debt and Equity Funds for Business: Trends and Problems of
Measurement, (National Bureau of Economic Research). The traditional approach to the
effects of leverage has been attacked for years beginning with Modigliani & Miller, The
Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 Am. Econ. Rev.
261 (1958). However, many of the assumptions made by Modigliani and Miller such as
the ignoring of tax effects, to reach their conclusion have been recognized as unrealistic.
See Bagwell and Shoven, Share Repurchases and Acquisitions [hereinafter Bagwell], in
Auerbach, supra note 16, at 194.
276. Canellos, The Overleveraged Acquisition, 39 Tax Law. 91, 106. See infra text
accompanying notes 304-20.
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of making management more accountable because the interest payments
must be made. 277 The leverage bonds management to the shareholders
and the market's interest because it reduces the discretion of management
to spend the corporation's cash flow in unproductive means. 27s In ad-
dition, leverage forces management to concentrate on the bottom line,
because of the risk of default and the fact that their job depends upon
the continued solvency of the firm. 279
A high amount of leverage also acts as a signaling device telling
the market that management is confident of its future, and of necessity
makes the corporation more sensitive to market shifts and cycles since
this constant interest payment must be made. 2s0 Nevertheless, manage-
ment's constant devotion to financing and investment may detract from
actual management of the corporation's affairs. 28 '
Furthermore, there are strong arguments that the increase in risk is
borne disproportionately by the employees and managers of the cor-
poration, not the shareholders. 28 2 Both employees and managers have
invested their human capital, hard work, and knowledge in the firm
for which they work, and cannot easily withdraw their "investment.' '283
While shareholders are also at risk and do own the corporation, they
can never lose more than the money they paid for their shares, and
shareholders can diversify their risk by investing in a balanced portfolio
of different corporations. 214
277. Shareholders versus Managers, supra note 242, at 28; Jensen, supra note 260, at
323. The more leverage a corporation has incurred, the more earnings that must be devoted
to interest payments. Because of the mandatory payments required to creditors, less cash
flow of the corporation is available for spending at the discretion of managers, reducing
the amount of retained earnings available for corporate waste. Id.
278. Jensen, supra note 260, at 320-24. On the other hand, a corporation that depends
on equity or the use of retained earnings has no mandatory payments and can pay when
business is good, and not pay when business is bad and gives management greater discretion.
279. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 260, at 323; Shareholders versus Managers, supra
note 242, at 27 (citing Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 Am.
Econ. Rev. 650 (1984)).
280. Roughly two-fifths of merger and acquisition activity as well as LBO's has involved
companies in cyclically sensitive industries that are liable to run into trouble in an economic
downturn. Leveraged Buyouts and Corporate Takeovers: Hearings Before the House
Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 130 (1989) (Statement of Alan Greenspan).
281. Weiss, supra note 198, at 363; Shareholders versus Managers, supra note 268,
at 63.
282. Coffee, supra note 9, at 105; Shareholders versus Managers, supra note 242, at
17-19.
283. Takeover Dangers, supra note 15, at 305. Of course layoffs, plant closings and
relocations are a result of the American free market system and result in the most efficient
use of resources and the highest optimum employment. Regulating the Market, supra note
15, at 1221. For discussion see Shareholders versus Managers, supra note 242, at 17-19.
284. Shareholders versus Managers, supra note 242, at 19-20.
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The shareholder's interest also will diverge from that of the firm's
employees when the corporation is financed with a high degree of debt.
Leverage increases the potential for extraordinary gains, but at some
point the amount of debt will surpass the value of the firm's assets in
the account of default. At this point any increase in leverage, and
consequently in the firm's possible returns, can only benefit the share-
holder, while the possibility of a decrease in the firm's earnings or
default does not appreciably affect the shareholder's zero return anyway.
The value of being able to transfer worthless assets at a fixed price is
more valuable than being able to transfer valuable assets at a fixed
price, and the incentive is for shareholders to increase the amount of
leverage. 2 5
The actual evidence of the effects of leverage is limited. But if one
examined every example that opponents of takeovers offer as proof of
the harm caused by takeovers, one would see that it was not the cost
of defending against the takeovers or the actual change of control that
caused the harm, but the large amounts of leverage that required debt
service. 286
There is evidence that R&D is reduced in takeovers only where the
debt-equity ratio is high. 28 7 In a subjective study, the Office of Tech-
nology Assessment (OTA), after interviewing the corporate managers of
R&D of 19 corporations that had been taken over or subject to takeover
related restructuring, found that whether or not control had shifted did
not determine whether R&D would be cut; how much debt had been
incurred was the determinative factor. 28 This conclusion is also in line
285. See Coffee, supra note 9, at 103; Burnham, Limits on Liability Actually are
What Invite the LBO's, Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 1989, at A14, col. 6.
286. For example, Philip Petroleum's restructuring incurred $5 billion in debt in
response to bids by T. Boone Pickens and Carl Icahn. See, e.g., Potts, Phillips Offers
a Blueprint for Industry Change, Washington Post, Mar. 17, 1985, at DI, col. 1; Cuff,
Phillips Sees Benefits in Fight; Others Unsure, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1985, at DI, col.
1; Impact of Mergers, supra note 12, at 46-48 (Statement of Paul M. Hirsch, Professor
of Business Policy, Univ. of Chicago, Graduate School of Business). See also Proxmire,
Introduction: What's Right and Wrong about Hostile Takeovers?, 1988 Wisc. L. Rev.
353, 354.
287. Corporate Restructuring and R&D: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Science,
Research and Technology of the House Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1989) [hereinafter Corporate Restructuring] (Statements of Julie Gorte,
Senior Analyst, Office of Technology Assessment).
288. Id. The firms included: Stauffer Chemical, Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation,
Radian Corporation, Polaroid Corporation, Tenneco, G.D. Searle and Company, USG
Corporation, Hoechst Celanese Corporation, Proctor and Gamble Company, Union Car-
bide Corporation, Phillips Petroleum Company, Owens-Illinois Company, Borg Warner
Automotive, Inc., Datapoint Corporation, Reliance Electric Company, Zenith Electronics
Company, Caterpillar, Inc., Baker Hughes Incorporated, and Goodyear Tire and Rubber
Company. Six had mounted successful hostile defenses, three were hostile takeovers, three
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with the results of individual corporate restructuring, 2s9 and a National
Science Foundation study found that "R&D declined between 1986 and
1987 by 12.8% for the 8 out of 200 leading U.S. R&D performing
companies which had undergone" an LBO or non-merger restructuring. 29°
Furthermore, there is some evidence that LBO's, which by definition
involve a significant amount of debt, reduce employment, and one study
found that on average LBO's reduced employment 15.3% .291 Neverthe-
less, many commentators believe the increased use of leverage has not
had any ill effects and characterize both debt and equity as claims on
a corporation's income stream with little distinction. 292
B. Leverage and State Policy Concerns
1. Leverage and Risk
The states and the federal government have a legitimate interest in
protecting against unnecessary economic dislocations and reduced pro-
ductivity of American corporations. The restriction of corporate change
of control transactions, however, does not further those goals. The
evidence supports that corporate change of control transactions do not
reduce employment, R&D, community support, or other state interests.
If anything has caused any societal or economic detriment, the evidence
indicates it is the increasing use of debt financing.
The evidence is not clear and this paper, does not so suggest, but
if anything is to be regulated it should be the use of leverage. High
levels of leverage have been implicated in numerous stories of lay-offs
and cuts in productive corporate spending, such as R&D. Furthermore,
it seems clear that at some point the benefits of the monitoring function
of the leverage are overcome by the costs of distracted management
and employees. 293
were LBO's and three were friendly takeovers or mergers.
This evidence is by no means conclusive. Other studies have found no reduction in
R&D. See Corporate Restructuring, supra note 287, at 90 (Statement of Frank R. Lich-
tenberg, Associate Professor at the Columbia University Graduate School of Business,
Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research).
289. For example, Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation, which was taken private in
a leveraged buyout to avoid being taken over by the Wickes Cos., cut its research budget
in half and laid off 480 out of 970 research employees. Willoughby, What A Raider
Hath Wrought, Forbes, Mar. 23, 1987, at 56. Polaroid Corporation, after restructuring
to defeat a takeover, reduced R&D from 8.5% of sales to 7.5% of sales and laid off
400 employees from their R&D department. Corporate Restructuring, supra note 287, at
14 (Statement of Dr. Julie Gorte, Senior Analyst, OTA).
290. Corporate Restructuring, supra note 287, at 60.
291. Id.
292. Blackwell, supra note 173, at 172-79.
293. See supra note 281.
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For commentators such as John C. Coffee who do not believe that
a completely open market for corporate control should exist, their con-
cerns have focused on the risk that managers and stakeholders face as
compared to shareholders.2 94 This risk is created by the large amounts
of leverage either used to finance a takeover or required by the market
as an efficient allocation of assets in order to avoid a takeover.2 9 Efforts
to attribute all the recent trend to increase the leverage to change of
control and related transactions put the cart before the horse.29 Cor-
porations are taken over because, in part, the market perceives that the
corporation would be more valuable if it increased its leverage. 297 To
the extent that management ignores the market's demands, its corpo-
ration is taken over and restructured to increase its leverage.
Coffee advocates that part of the tension between shareholders and
management is the difference in preference toward risk. Since manage-
ment, employees, and other stakeholders may invest their entire human
capital with a firm and cannot diversify their risk, they are risk averse. 298
By definition, leverage increases the risk for the firm.2 Concerns about
employment loss and corporate productivity can be better addressed by
trying to reduce the market's preference for leverage, rather than limiting
the market for corporate control. There is no evidence that change of
control in itself increases the risk of economic dislocation. The restruc-
turing of the corporation using debt is just a symptom of the market's
preference for leverage. 3°°
The record amounts of leverage in the American economy also have
systemic effects. Roughly two-fifths of merger and acquisition activity,
as well as LBO's, has involved companies in cyclically sensitive industries
that are liable to run into trouble in an economic downturn. 01 The high
amounts of leverage may make some firms unable to withstand market
downturns and force bankruptcies. The high degree of borrowing also
makes American corporations dependent on foreign suppliers of capital,
subjecting corporate finance to the whims of overseas capital markets.
294. Shareholders versus Managers, supra note 242, at 17-24.
295. Id. at 42-44.
296. Id. at 41-42.
297. Of course the innovations in the financial markets and the ability to finance
transactions such as the RJR Nabisco LBO have made takeover transactions easier.
298. In fact, management's preference for large retained earnings can be attributed to
this risk averseness.
299. See supra notes 189 & 275.
300. See Canellos, supra note 276, at 100. It is true that without the continuing increase
in efficiency in financial markets, leverage would not be available in the large transactions
taking place today. Blackwell, supra note 173, at 164.
301. Leveraged Buyouts and Corporate Takeovers: Hearings before the House Comm.
on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 130 (1989) [hereinafter
LBOs and Corporate Takeovers] (statement of Alan Greenspan).
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As discussed above, leverage has several beneficial functions in cor-
porate governance, such as signaling, bonding the managers to the
shareholders, and reducing the free cash flow.30 2 Leverage is usually less
expensive than equity financing, and easier to arrange. Artificial res-
trictions on the use of leverage could hurt the American economy,
especially by retarding developing industries, and reduce American world-
competitiveness.3 03
2. Leverage and the Double Taxation of Dividends
The Internal Revenue Code's double taxation of dividends from
equity is perceived as one of the reasons for the market's preference
for debt financing. °4 Interest payments on debt are tax deductible as
an expense for businesses and are only taxed once as income to the
lender, while dividend payments to shareholders are taxed once as cor-
porate earnings and a second time as income to the shareholder.3 °0
Because of the double taxation, a corporation's cost of capital decreases,
and consequently its value increases, when debt is substituted for eq-
uity 3°0 and dividend payments are discouraged.3 07
The double taxation of dividends requires more of the firm's earnings
to pay the same real rate of return on equity. A company must earn
$1.50 of pre-tax earnings to pay out $1.00 in dividends, while it only
takes $1.00 of pre-tax earnings to pay $1.00 of interest payments. 08 The
302. See supra notes 276-81.
303. See Tax Panels to Consider Curbs on Corporate Debt, Cong. Q., Jan. 21, 1989,
at 118 [hereinafter Tax Panels).
304. See Canellos, supra note 276, at 100; Leveraged Buyouts and the Pot of Gold:
Trends, Public Policy, and Case Studies: A Report for the Use of the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. 35 (1987) [hereinafter Leveraged Buyouts]; LBOs and Corporate Takeovers, supra
note 301, at 3 (Statement of Allen Sinai, Chief Economist and Executive Vice President,
the Boston Co.); Blackwell, supra note 173, at 176; Weidenbaum, supra note 24, at 18
(citing Federal Income Tax Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions, Joint Committee on
Taxation at 4 (1985)). However, some commentators believe that the difference in taxation
has only a limited effect on the market for corporate control. See, e.g., Auerbach and
Reishus, The Effects of Taxation on the Merger Decision, in A. Auerbach, supra note
16, at 178.
305. Van Horne, supra note 265, at 260. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 9, at 294.
306. Zolt, Corporate Taxation After the Tax Reform Act of 1986: A State of Dise-
quilibrium, 66 N.C.L. Rev. 839, 843 (1988).
307. Peel, A Proposal for Eliminating Double Taxation of Corporate Dividends, 39
Tax Law. 1, 4 (1985).
308. Saunders, How the Government Subsidizes Leveraged Takeovers, Forbes, Nov.
28, 1988, at 192; Zolt, supra note 306, at 843.
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double taxation makes debt less expensive than equity as a means of
financing.) 9
The double taxation of dividends also discourages the payment of
dividends because shareholders would prefer distributions through either
capital gains or eventual takeovers. °10 In addition, the double taxation
of dividends makes it relatively more attractive to distribute earnings in
share repurchases or some form of restructuring other than dividends.'"
The deduction for interest payments is also an incentive in restructurings,
where payments on the new debt can shield corporate earnings.
3 12
The double taxation of dividends has forced the market to disguise
basically equity instruments as debt instruments like "junk bonds," and
the artificial taxation structure built on the nomenclature of the respective
financing instrument just creates further distortions."' The problem of
accurately distinguishing between debt and equity is impossible. 1 4 The
new debt financing of corporations has resulted in an ad hoc corporate
tax integration. The corporations are using securities such as junk bonds,
which only pay residual corporate profits corresponding to an equity
position, and characterizing them as debt to increase the return to security
holders and lower the cost of capital to the corporation. The problem
is that while reducing tax rates, the required regular payments of debt
financing and the defined events of default are increasing the risk of
corporate default and failure. 3 1
Double taxation of equity also causes agency costs for the firm in
addition to the economic effects. The double taxation of equity gives
management an incentive to retain earnings instead of returning the gains
to shareholders.31 6 The 1986 tax reform eliminated the lower capital gains
309. McLure, Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income Taxes: The Missing
Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 532, 540-41 (1975); Leveraged
Buyouts, supra note 304, at 35. This effect may have been aggravated by the 1986 tax
reform. See Zolt, supra note 306, at 865-66.
310. Peel, supra note 307, at 4.
311. Bagwell, supra note 275, at 192; Peel, supra note 307, at 3.
312. Peel, supra note 307, at 5; Canellos, supra note 276, at 100. It has been confirmed
by several studies that after an LBO, firms pay almost no taxes; these tax benefits are
between 310 and 1350o of the premiums paid to shareholders. But these tax savings
may be offset by the taxes paid by stockholders, investors and bond holders on the
income. Corporate Restructuring, supra note 287, at 61. See also McLure, Integration of
the Personal and Corporate Income Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform
Proposals, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 532; Warren, The Relation and Integration of Individual
and Corporate Income Taxes, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 719 (1981).
313. See Canellos, supra note 276, at 109-11, 113.
314. Id. at 109 (citing B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations
and Shareholders 4-10 (4th ed. 1979)); Warren, supra note 312, at 737-38.
315. Zolt, supra note 306, at 875.
316. See id. at 844; Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 597,
651 (1989); Peel, supra note 307, at 2-3.
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rate and lower corporate tax rationales for retaining earnings,3 17 but the
double taxation justification remains.3"' Double taxation of dividends
discourages the distribution of dividends by corporate managers and
offers a rationalization for large amounts of retained earnings.31 9 The
increase of agency costs and encouragement of retained earnings caused
by double taxation of dividends and the reduction of shareholder benefits
and control that results is evidenced by the fact that management and
management groups such as the Business Roundtable vehemently opposed
efforts in both the Reagan and Carter administrations to equalize the
taxation of debt and equity. 20
The double taxation of dividends is creating distortions in corpo-
rations' financial structure by favoring debt. This bias may be increasing
the risk of corporate failure and/or economic dislocations. No evidence
indicates change of control transactions create additional risks of eco-
nomic dislocation, but considerable evidence exists to show that high
debt/equity ratios can reduce corporate performance and research and
development and increase the risk of corporate failure and economic
dislocation.
VIII. TIHE NEED FOR LEGISLATION
A. The Need for Federal Legislation
The problem with any comprehensive legislation is the continuing
disagreement as to the role and functioning of the public corporation
in American society.32' The wholesale preemption of state anti-takeover
laws is probably not appropriate considering the discord in the academic
arena and the significant policy choices that must be made. 322 The lack
of a clear academic consensus, in addition, complicates any policy choice
because Congress is then even more easily swayed by special interests. 23
In fact, one commentator believes that any move to enact federal leg-
317. Bryan, supra note 252, at 1070.
318. Id. at 1073.
319. Zolt, supra note 306, at 844.
320. Saunders, supra note 308, at 194. As explained by Senator Robert Packwood,
management " 'feared that corporations would be under unholy pressure to declare
dividends' so their stockholders could get the credits." Caution Urged as Tax Panel Eyes
Corporate Debt, Cong. Q., Jan. 28, 1989, at 162. See also Sheppard, Subchapter C
Reform: Live Aid for Elective Carryover Basis, 35 Tax Notes 225, 228 (1987); Sheppard,
Through the Looking Glass, 35 Tax Notes 436, 436-37 (1987).
321. Corporate Takeovers, supra note 9, at 9.
322. See Pinto, The Constitution and the Market for Corporate Control: State Takeover
Statutes After CTS Corp., 29 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 699, 726 (1988); Corporate Takeovers,
supra note 9, at 9; Roll, supra note 149, at 241.
323. See Davis, supra note 102, at 500.
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islation to restrict state regulation of takeovers may backfire and ulti-
mately result in increased federal restrictions of takeovers.3 4 On the
other hand, a complete preemption would probably be better than today's
heavily management-biased legislation.
Even though uncertainty abounds regarding the effect of takeovers
and anti-takeover statutes on the American economy, at some point
policy makers must make a decision before a fully developed model is
created.325 What is clear is that the American economy and shareholders
of American corporations are being deprived of corporate earnings through
either management waste or indifference. The market responded to this
management behavior by creating a corporate control market in which
this unrealized value was returned to shareholders in tender offers.
Corporate management, in response to this pressure, used the state
legislative process to disrupt the market for corporate control. Man-
agement used the legislative process to side-step their own shareholders
and avoid a vote. This initial management pressure has now created a
"race to the bottom" to provide management with the maximum possible
guarantees of job security at the expense of American jobs and the
American economy.
No evidence supports that anti-takeover statutes provide any benefits,
and much evidence shows they provide none. The irony is that the only
group deriving benefits from anti-takeover transactions, i.e. management,
is the group that did not need any protection in the first place. In
addition to corporate takeover concerns, management compensation no
longer possesses any rational basis and further demonstrates the alien-
ation of management from the shareholders.
What has emerged is a corporate management accountable to no
one except for the grossest acts of negligence or intentional misconduct.
Management has now initiated a bidding war between the states to see
who can entrench incumbent management the furthest. The states are
caught in their own "prisoner's dilemma"; they cannot afford to refuse
managers their demanded protections without risk of losing domestic
jobs, even though the states may know that the protections hurt the
nation as a whole.
Obviously, the entire state anti-takeover area is ripe for federal
legislation. 26 Neither the states nor the exchanges have provided any
leadership in this area.327 This paper advocates a moderate proposal that
will restore some power to the shareholders of corporations and equalize
the value of debt and equity.
324. Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra note 101, at 472.
325. See Gordon & Kornhauser, Takeover Defense Tactics: A Comment on Two
Models, 96 Yale L.J. 295, 320-21 (1986).
326. Hazen, supra note 35, at 108.
327. Corporate Takeovers, supra note 9, at 105-06.
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B. Proposal
To bring evenhandedness to the state legislation of corporate control
transactions while protecting the state interests expressed, this paper
makes four proposals: three proposals to amend the Williams Act and
one proposal to amend the Internal Revenue Code. To protect the
shareholders, eliminate side payments, and allow control over manage-
ment, the first proposal is an amendment to the Williams Act that
would subject management to the same requirements as outside bidders
for changes of control and other related transactions in state anti-
takeover statutes. The second proposal is similar and would require that
all corporations opt into protections of anti-takeover statutes by share-
holder vote. Both of these provisions should expressly preempt state
law.
In addition, to satisfy the states' concerns for the welfare of share-
holders and deal with the problems of the possible coercive effect of
tender offers, the third proposal would amend the Williams Act to
require a vote on the pending tender offer to be tendered along with
the shareholder's shares. This idea, advocated by Lucian Bebchuk, would
allow shareholders to vote against an acquisition, but still take advantage
of the control premium if the shareholders as a whole approved the
transaction. This proposal is similar to state control share acquisition
acts; however, this proposal would unify the voting and tendering re-
quirements and would not allow management to delay the consummation
of a tender offer.
Finally, to protect management, employees, and other stakeholders,
the fourth proposal would seek to discourage leverage by improving the
economic return on equity by reducing the double taxation of equity
through a fifty percent credit given shareholders for corporate taxes
already paid. The measure would have to increase overall corporate taxes
to remain revenue neutral.
1. Restoring Power to the Shareholders
Besides change of control transactions, academic literature has rec-
ognized four methods of controlling management, including limited char-
ter executive authority, incentive compensation, legislative amendment
of corporate charters, and judicial review of management actions. All
of these have failed. 328 The market for corporate control is the only
serious mechanism for limiting management opportunism, 329 and man-
agement through state anti-takeover legislation has effectively stripped
328. Carney, supra note 218, at 387-88. For discussion see supra text accompanying
notes 213-220.
329. Gilson, supra note 79, at 841.
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it from the shareholders without their consent. Not only are shareholders
hurt by these proposals, but our entire economy is affected.
It is clear, however, that anti-takeover amendments have a place in
some areas of corporate law. What this paper proposes is to reinsert
the shareholders' control by requiring shareholder approval before a
corporation is protected under all state anti-takeover statutes. Further-
more, to ensure that there are no incentives for side payments to
management to approve mergers and that managers do not take ad-
vantage of the shareholders, this paper proposes that all state anti-
takeover statutes that impose voting, minimum offer, business combi-
nation or mandatory redemption provisions apply equally to both man-
agement and outside bidders.3 0
This proposal would be similar to Gilson's ideas to return control
of corporate control decisions to shareholders.33 ' Shareholders cannot
realistically control the actions of management.3 2 The market for cor-
porate control exists as the only disciplinary mechanism available. To
ensure that the shareholders' control over management continues to
function, any state statute that provides impediments to the market for
control would have to be approved by shareholders before being effective
for a particular corporation. A similar proposal should also apply to
other defensive measures taken by management outside a particular
statute.
33
330. Leading commentators recognize that shareholder approval is a way to mitigate
against management conflicts of interest. See Ribstein, supra note 4, at 110-111; Takeover
Controversy, supra note 160, at 345.
331. Gilson, supra note 79, at 879. This proposal is also similar to the approach taken
in the ALl Corporate Governance project, Transactions in Control. Carney, supra note
218, at 408.
332. Gilson, supra note 79, at 834.
333. Management acts that significantly impeded a takeover would require shareholder
approval. The impediments would be defined in two levels, similar to the ALl project
on corporate governance. Corporate acts that would always result in increased costs for
outside bidders would always have to be approved by shareholders. Examples include acts
requiring shareholder approval, mandatory pricing formulas, special stock dividends such
as poison pills, and other corporate acts in the nature of anti-takeover amendments.
Corporate acts that could result in the defeat of a tender offer, but could also have a
legitimate business purpose, would only be subject to shareholder approval if a tender
offer or merger offer was pending before the corporation. Examples would include selective
self-tenders, sales of substantial assets of the corporation, and acquisitions that might
have negative anti-trust implications.
The author understands that these shareholder approval requirements could be burden-
some in both time and expense, and that tender offers do not often give management
sufficient time to get shareholder approval. Time concerns can be answered by opting
into protections of the state takeover statutes at the corporation's earliest opportunity.
Time concerns in the case of defensive tactics could be mitigated by the appropriate use
of a TRO or preliminary injunction until shareholder approval can be obtained. Expense
19911
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
A complete preemption of state anti-takeover laws may in fact be
the best solution.1"4 Nevertheless, the raging debates, bitter disagreements,
and strong preferences expressed by American corporations for this kind
of protection through adoption of defensive maneuvers,33 mitigate against
a complete preemption of state law. This proposal would simply restore
shareholder control and prevent possible management side payments. It
is a balanced approach in the spirit of the Williams Act,33 6 which does
not favor management or shareholders, 3 7 that should be politically sup-
ported.3 s It simply restores the balance that previously existed in the
market. Management can have all the protections that they deem nec-
essary, but not without shareholder approval.
concerns should be taken into consideration when a corporation's management is consid-
ering a possible anti-takeover maneuver. The language is also rather broad, but most
obvious anti-takeover defenses would be covered during the pendency of a tender offer,
and most defenses that are enacted outside the immediate threat of a tender offer are
likewise apparent. Defenses that are better hidden, such as acquiring corporations to create
anti-trust problems, could be resolved by the economic benefit test, but would only be
able to be contested during the pendency of an offer, so as to not limit management's
discretion in most cases.
334. See Easterbrook & Fischell, supra note 10, at 1194.
335. As of June 1989, approximately 43% of the United States' largest 1,440 public
corporations (93% of total capitalization on the New York Stock Exchange, the American
Stock Exchange, and the NASDAQ) had poison pill plans. Almost Half of Larger U.S.
Companies Have Poison Pill Plans, Study Reports, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 43,
at 1630 (Nov. 3, 1989). In addition, 54% had staggered terms, and 32% had adopted
fair price amendments which requires a bidder to pay all shareholders the same price.
Almost 17% required a supermajority to approve a proposed merger and 7.4% had
adopted dual class capitalization plans. In 1986 a survey of the Fortune 500 found that
approximately 30% of the firms had adopted poison pill plans. Almost 30 Percent of
Fortune 500 Firms Have Adopted Poison Pills, Study Finds, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 7, at 223 (Feb. 13, 1987).
336. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78d-f (1989).
337. In the Senate report on the Williams Act, and also in the House of Representative's
report, Congress was careful to indicate the neutrality of the act:
It was strongly urged during the hearings that takeover bids should not be
discouraged because they serve a useful purpose in providing a check on en-
trenched but inefficient management. It was also recognized that these bids are
made for many other reasons, and do not always reflect a desire to improve
the management of the company . .. [This bill) avoids tipping the balance of
regulation either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the
takeover bid.
Johnson & Millon, supra note 87, at 1893 (citing Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity
Ownership and in Corporate Takeover Bids: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities
of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967)); Steinberg,
supra note 3, at 203.
338. A 1988 survey found that 79% of the persons surveyed supported state legislation
mandating shareholder approval of mergers. Future of Hostile Takeovers, supra note 101,
at 499 n.112.
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2. Shareholder Voting in Tender Offers
Most state anti-takeover statutes are justified as protection for share-
holders from coercive tactics by outside bidders.33 9 No evidence shows
shareholders are in fact coerced, 34 but in theory the possibility exists.3 4'
However, to ensure that shareholders are not pressured and to protect
the states' and the courts'3 42 avowed interest in protecting the share-
holders' undistorted choice in tendering decisions, this paper advocates
a proposal, first drafted by Lucian Bebchuk, that would require share-
holders to tender along with their shares a vote approving or disapproving
any tender offer. 343
Under this proposal, the bid's success would depend on whether
shareholders holding a majority of the shares approved the tender offer
through a vote, not on the number of shares tendered. If a shareholder
voted against the takeover, but nevertheless tendered his shares, the
shareholder could still take advantage of the premium offered if share-
holders holding a majority of shares approved the transaction.34 The
shareholder could vote against the tender offer without fear of losing
any premium or becoming a minority shareholder. In addition, if the
tender offeror was interested in a partial tender, a second vote would
be turned in, along with the first vote, indicating whether the shareholder
would approve or disapprove of a partial offer.3 45 Shares that were not
tendered would be counted as "no" votes.
This provision would not discourage tender offers, except for the
theoretical lessened coercion on shareholders. 3" This proposal would also
not increase premiums paid in tender offers or create incentives for side
payments to management. In effect, the statute would provide almost
complete protection against possible shareholder coercion problems with-
out creating an external regulatory body or management entrenchment
339. The shareholder coercion rationale is also offered to justify management defensive
tactics. See, e.g., Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 17-20 (1987).
340. See supra text accompanying notes 14, 148-58.
341. Bebchuk, The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy, 12 Del.
J. Corp. L. 911, 914-931 (1987) [hereinafter The Pressure to Tender]; Loewenstein, Toward
an Auction Market for Corporate Control and the Demise of the Business Judgment
Rule, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 65, 84 (1989).
342. See, e.g, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 82-83, 107 S.
Ct. 1637, 1646 (1987) ("The Indiana Act operates on the assumption, implicit in the
Williams Act, that independent shareholders faced with tender offers often, are at a
disadvantage. By allowing such shareholders to vote as a group, the Act protects them
from the coercive aspects of some tender offers.").
343. The Pressure to Tender, supra note 341, at 931.
344. Id. at 932.
345. Id.
346. See Easterbrook & Fischell, supra note 10, at 710-11.
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problems. Management would be free to solicit offers or offer advice
on the virtues of the contemplated offer, but unlike state statutes, they
would have no veto power over the transaction.3 47 Furthermore, the
shareholder coercion rationale for defensive maneuvers and state anti-
takeover legislation would be eliminated. 4
In addition, this proposal could be easily amended to the Williams
Act and should not create additional administrative or regulatory bur-
dens. This provision would provide balance to the proposed legislation
and further the states' professed intent to protect shareholders.
3. Reducing Leverage in the Market Place
The Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives
in recent hearings came up with over twenty-one different proposals to
reduce leverage in corporations.3 49 Most proposals fit into four categories.
The first type of proposal seeks to limit the leverage of corporations
by limiting the interest deduction for corporations. S0 The second type
would set required debt equity ratios and impose tax penalties on cor-
porations that exceeded the ratio."' The third type would provide tax
penalties on certain types of financial instruments such as junk bonds.35 2
The fourth type of proposal equalizes the taxation of debt and equity.
Limitations on interest deductions, including limits on high-yield,
high-risk bonds, penalize American corporations. Limits on interest de-
ductions could deny needed capital to start-up companies or other com-
panies who invest heavily in research and depend heavily on debt. 53
Limits on "junk bonds" and other high-risk, high-yield instruments
347. See supra text accompanying notes 70-71.
348. See, e.g., Loewenstein, supra note 341, at 80.
349. Panel Issues Tax Options for LBOs, Cong. Q., Apr. 15, 1989, at 807.
350. Some of these proposals included: "deny the corporate interest deduction for
debt incurred to finance purchases of 200 or more of a company's stock in a hostile
takeover"; "deny the interest deduction for debt incurred to finance mergers that are not
in the public interest, as determined by such factors as job loss and decline in the local
tax base"; "deny the interest deduction for high-yield, high risk 'junk bonds' above a
certain limit; "repeal the corporate interest deduction and instead allow a credit to
shareholders for the corporate taxes paid on earnings that are distributed as dividends."
Id.
351. Some of the proposals included: "deny as much as 50% of a company's interest
deductions for transactions that change its ratio of debt to equity to an undesirable level,"
"limit the interest deduction for transactions in which a corporation's net interest payments
exceed a set percentage of its taxable income." Id.
352. For example, "deny the interest deduction for high-yield, high-risk 'junk bonds'
above a limit, such as $50 million." Id.
353. See Tax Panels, supra note 303, at 118. Limits on interest deductions also hurt
American corporations in relation to foreign competitors who would have a cheaper cost
of capital. Id.; Hale, How to Lower the Leverage Boom, Wall St. J., Nov. 29, 1988,
at A22, col. 3; Saunders, supra note 308, at 195.
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likewise penalized younger or riskier companies that cannot get prime
rates when borrowing. 3 4 Furthermore, limitations on riskier debt in-
struments may not have any effect. While junk bonds have been influ-
ential in facilitating large transactions, overall they compose only a small
amount of total debt in change of control transactions. 35
Set debt-equity ratios would likewise retard American industry and
create expensive administrative burdens. 35 6 There is no feasible method
whereby the government could discern the "correct" debt-equity ratio
for a particular industry, nor is there any method to account for var-
iations in particular industries' markets and the credit markets them-
selves. 357 Any required debt-equity ratio would simply create distortions
in credit flows and impede the efficient allocation of credit . 3
The answer to reducing leverage in American corporations is easy:
eliminate the double taxation of dividends.3 5 9 The problem is the large
loss of federal revenue if such a proposal is passed. 360 To be successful,
such a proposal would have to be revenue neutral and make up the
proposed losses by increasing the corporate tax rate.
There have been numerous proposals to integrate the taxation of
corporate and personal income taxes. 36' Proposals have included elimi-
nation of the corporate tax altogether, 362 excluding dividends from taxable
354. Hostile Takeovers, supra note 12, at 18 (Statement of Michael Bradley).
355. An SEC study of 272 successful cash tender offers that took place between 1981
and 1985 found that bank borrowing provided 78.6%, new debt issues 0.3%, internal
funds 18.3%, and equity 2.8% of the average financing from 1981 to 1984. However,
for 1985, the SEC found that on average, bank financing provided 77.6%, equity 2%,
internal funds 6.80, and new debt issues 13.6% of the tender offer financing. Junk
bonds were used more in hostile takeovers (25%) and also in bigger deals (37%), but
only furnished 6% of the financing for friendly takeovers. SEC Staff Says Junk Bonds
Being Used More Frequently to Finance Takeovers, 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No.
26, at 937 (June 27, 1986).
356. Corporate Takeovers, supra note 9, at 63-64. Proposals usually entail setting up
an industry-by-industry schedule of acceptable ranges for debt-equity ratios and eliminating
the interest deduction for corporations whose debt exceeds these ratios. See Leveraged
Buyouts, supra note 304, at 37.
357. Id.
358. Hostile Takeovers, supra note 12, at 63-64 (Statement of Preston Martin, Vice-
Chairman of the Federal Reserve).
359. See, e.g., LBO's and Corporate Takeovers, supra note 301, at 132 (Statement of
Alan Greenspan).
360. The price of even a small deduction for corporate dividend payments would be
tremendous. In 1985, when the Reagan Administration proposed a 10% deduction, the
estimated cost was $7 billion a year. Tax Panels, supra note 303, at 118. See also Bentsen
Proposes Limit on Carryback Tax Refunds from LBOs, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No.
32, at 1220 (Aug. 11, 1989).
361. See generally McLure, supra note 309, at 549-61.
362. This method may be the simplest, but it is impossible considering current federal
revenue needs.
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income 63 treating corporations like partnerships,3" a dividends-received
exclusion,3 65 a dividends-received credit,3" and a dividends-paid deduction
for corporations.167 The best proposal in terms of fairness, least distortion
to the tax structure, ease of administration, cost, and the ability to
capture income, is the dividends-received credit for individuals. 6
The dividends-received credit would distribute tax credits to share-
holders based on a standard corporate credit that would approximate
the amount of taxes a particular corporation paid on distributed divi-
dends. Any variance between the corporate and individual rates could
then be adjusted at the corporate level. 69 The dividends-received credit
system would transform the corporate income tax into a tax on retained
earnings, encouraging corporate managers to distribute retained earnings
that are not creating profits for the firm.370 Combined with the present
preference toward elimination of the capital gains tax and higher cor-
porate over individual tax rates, this proposal would resemble earlier
model tax integration proposals and eliminate earlier criticisms of other
piecemeal integration proposals.3 7'
The complete mechanics of any corporate tax integration cannot be
adequately discussed in this paper, but there is abundant literature
regarding the mechanics of the dividends-received credit in both the
academic area372 and in the two separate proposals by the Reagan and
Carter administrations .
7 3
363. See Peel, supra note 307, at 13-14.
364. McLure, supra note 309, at 549-50.
365. Id. at 552-53.
366. Id. at 553-54.
367. Id. at 554-55.
368. Birnbaum & Duke, Tax Writers Move on Plan to Curb LBO's, Wall St. J., Jan.
26, 1989 at 2, Col. 2. A dividend-received credit for corporations would create problems
because dividend payments to tax-exempt entities and foreigners would require special
treatment. There are arguments, however, that this is the fairest system, and provides the
corporation with the greatest incentive to distribute profits. The dividend-received credit
proposed by the author is a modified system, similar to the Canadian Carter Commission's
proposal. Earlier criticisms of the divident-received credit have been resolved by the 1986
Tax Reform. See McLure, supra note 309, at 558-61.
369. Birnbaum & Duke, supra note 368, at 2.
370. Bell, supra note 259, at 62-63.
371. The Carter Commission was a comprehensive study of individual and corporate
tax rates conducted in Canada. See McLure, supra note 309, at 569-74. See, e.g., Warren,
supra note 312, at 771-72.
372. See, e.g., McLure, supra note 309, at 570-74; Peel, supra note 307, at 11-12;
Zolt, supra note 306, at 850-52; Warren, supra note 312, at 773-74.
373. See The President's 1978 Tax Reduction and Reform Proposals: Hearings Before
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3389-557, 6063-274 (1979);
U.S. Dep't. of the Treasury, The Treasury Dep't Report to the President: Tax Reform
for Fairness, Growth, Simplicity, and Economic Growth (Nov. 1984).
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Overall, the proposal should provide two benefits. First, the equal-
ization in tax rates should reduce the market demand for debt-financed
companies, therefore lowering the debt/equity ratios and corresponding
risk that the corporation could fail, protecting against economic dislo-
cations of employees and other stakeholders. Second, the equalization
of debt and equity would further reduce management agency problems
by reducing possible rationales for retaining earnings and making it more
expensive, because of increased corporate taxes, to not distribute cor-
porate earnings.
IX. CONCLUSION
The offered rationale behind anti-takeover statutes is the protection
of shareholders and stakeholders. No evidence supports that anti-takeover
statutes help either group, and significant evidence shows that the statutes
provide no assistance to either. Anti-takeover statutes have been imple-
mented almost entirely by corporate management, and compounded by
the unique American federal political structure of corporate law. Man-
agement is the one group that needs no protection, and these anti-
takeover statutes have created further disincentives for corporate effi-
ciency, fairness, and responsibility.
The drafters of the Constitution anticipated the economic warfare
and political externalities created by a federal system and included the
Commerce Clause in our Constitution.3 74 Anti-takeover statutes are ex-
actly the kind of political and economic externality the Commerce Clause
was drafted to prevent.375 No state has the power or the incentives to
resist the anti-takeover movement, "with the result that interstate eco-
nomic competition [has been] conducted more through political processes
than through the marketplace.13 76 Only federal legislation can overcome
the states' parochial interests and restore balance and fairness to anti-
takeover statutes while protecting the United States' overall economic
health.
Although there are still many uncertainties in the corporate takeover
area, Congress can no longer afford to sit back and watch. The four
proposals offered by this paper are not radical, but together they can
help restore some balance to American corporate law. The shareholder
control proposals simply recognize management's inherent conflicts with
the shareholders' interest and mitigate these conflicts through shareholder
approval. The shareholder tender vote proposal ensures the states' and
management's interests in protecting shareholders from coercive offers,
374. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6-3, at 404 (2d ed. 1988).
375. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 99-100, 107 S. Ct. 1637,
1655-56 (1987) (Justice White dissenting, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens).
376. Tribe, supra note 374, § 6-3, at 404.
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and reduces any possible conflicts of interest created under current law
by management "protection." The last proposal, reducing the double
taxation on dividends, recognizes the increase in risk for stakeholders,
employees, communities, and suppliers of corporations as a result of
the increase in debt. This proposal mitigates against this debt not by
penalizing the corporations, but by encouraging the use of equity. To-
gether, these proposals work to improve economic efficiency and reduce
shareholder-management conflicts of interest without creating additional
regulatory burdens on the corporation or on the government.
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